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The Fleet Modernization Program (FMP) provides a systematic 
structure for planning, programming, budgeting, and installing 
improvements to ships of the active and reserve fleets. The procedures for 
budgeting and executing the FMP are governed by the rules of the current 
FMP Fiscal Appropriation. Since Fiscal Year (FY) 1989, a series of FMP 
appropriation decisions has resulted in each budget year program being 
budgeted and executed differently. These decisions have directly affected fleet 
modernization efforts and have increased the complexity of the FMP, a 
program which is well known for its fragmented infrastructure and 
misunderstood procedures. This thesis analyzes the budget structure of the 
FMP and evaluates the impact of changes in the budget structure since FY 
1989, primarily as they relate to program execution. The research compares 
and contrasts funding and procedural differences between the FMP and the 
TRIDENT modernization program. The final results of this analysis are 
specific recommendations on how to restructure the FMP budget to improve 
program execution. Additionally, this research serves as a historical record of 
the FMP budget structure changes since FY 1989. 
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A. AREA OF RESEARCH 
Since Fiscal Year (FY) 1989, a series of Fleet Modernization Program 
(FMP) appropriation decisions has resulted in each budget year program being 
budgeted and executed differently. These decisions have directly affected fleet 
modernization efforts and have increased the complexity of the FMP, a 
program which is well known for its fragmented infrastructure and 
misunderstood procedures. This thesis analyzes the budget structure of the 
FMP and evaluates the impact of program changes in the budget structure 
since FY 1989, primarily in program execution. The research compares and 
contrasts funding differences between the FMP and the TRIDENT 
modernization program. The final results of this analysis are specific 
recommendations on how to restructure the FMP budget to improve 
program execution. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
• What would be the benefits of restructuring the FMP budget 
structure? 
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2. Secondary Research Questions 
• What is the FMP? 
• What factors led to the recent series of changes to the FMP budget 
structure? 
• In what ways have the changes in the FMP budget structure since 
FY 1990 affected program execution? 
• What factors are continuing to cause FMP execution problems? 
• What are the strengths and weaknesses of the current FMP budget 
structure? 
How does the TRIDENT modernization program differ from the 
FMP and why? 
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the TRIDENT 
modernization program? 
• What are the costs and benefits associated with restructuring the 
FMP budget structure? 
C. DISCUSSION 
The FMP provides a systematic structure for planning, programming, 
budgeting, and installing improvements to ships of the active and reserve 
fleets. The procedures for budgeting and executing the FMP are governed by 
the rules of the current FMP Fiscal Appropriation. 
Despite its complexity, the FMP is an essential part of the Navy's 
modernization plan based on the strategic vision outlined in ... From the Sea 
and more recently in Forward ... From the Sea, and the results of the Bottom 
Up Review conducted by the Department of Defense (DoD). In the post Cold 
War era of markedly reduced defense procurement spending, modernization 
of existing assets is a critical element of our defense posture. Although the 
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FMP comprises only a fraction of our total defense budget, this small 
investment significantly contributes to our ability to meet the "threat." 
As a result of its importance to the Navy's modernization efforts, the 
FMP has been the focus of several recent studies. A FMP Visionary Working 
Group was formed to identify root problems and recommend solutions, and 
the FMP was recently nominated by the Navy for cycle time reduction. Many 
of the concerns throughout the fleet can be summarized by the statement, "it 
seems that the budget process has overtaken the modernization process and 
has become more important than the ships and the Sailors." (Ennis et. al., 
1995, p. 4-11) 
To fully understand the complexities of the FMP, it is important to 
compare and contrast the differences between the FMP and another highly 
successful modernization program with a completely different budget 
structure. This program is the TRIDENT modernization program. Although 
the purpose of the TRIDENT modernization program is the same as that of 
the FMP, its budget structure is quite different. An understanding of the 
strengths and weaknesses of each budget structure is necessary prior to 
making constructive recommendations on how to restructure the FMP 
budget to improve program execution. 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
The research will concentrate on the FMP from the perspectives of the 
Director, Fiscal Management Division (N82), Director, Surface Warfare 
Division (N86), Director, Undersea Warfare Division (N87), and Naval Sea 
Systems Command (NA VSEA). 
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E. METHODOLOGY 
• Interviews were conducted with key personnel involved in the 
FMP and TRIDENT System within N82, N86, N87, and NAVSEA. 
The interviews concentrated on determining the strengths and 
weaknesses of the current FMP budget structure and 
recommendations for change. 
• Data was collected from the Fleet Modernization Program 
Management Information System (FMPMIS), the Ship Alteration 
Budgeting, Reporting, Evaluation System (SABRES), and the Ship 
Alteration Financial Execution System (SAFE). 
• Conclusions and recommendations from completed FMP studies 
and data from ongoing FMP studies were compiled. 
• Current financial structure draft proposals to reduce FMP cycle time 
were addressed. 
F. CHAPTER OUTLINE AND DISCUSSION 
1. Chapter I- Introduction 
2. Chapter II - Management Control: Line-Item Versus 
Lump-Sum. 
Chapter II establishes the overall framework for addressing the 
primary research question. It analyzes the use of line-item and lump-sum 
appropriations throughout the nation's history and concludes with a brief 
discussion of congressional micromanagement of the defense budget. 
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3. Chapter III- Overview of the FMP 
Chapter III presents an objective overview of the FMP. Chapter III 
attempts to simplify this complex program into an understandable 
interrelated system in preparation for addressing the changes to the FMP 
since FY 1989 and discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the current FMP 
budget structure. 
4. Chapter IV - Background and Analysis of Changes to the 
FMP Since FY 1989 
Chapter IV builds on the framework established in Chapter II and 
Chapter III by taking a hard look at the myriad of FMP budget structure 
changes since FY 1989. Extensive use of Congressional Record citations and 
dialogue serves to accurately record both when and why the changes were 
made and the consequences of these decisions. 
5. Chapter V- Strengths and Weaknesses of the FMP and 
TRIDENT Modernization Program 
Chapter V first presents an overview of TRIDENT modernization 
program. This overview serves as the basis for discussing the current 
strengths and weaknesses of each system. 
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6. Chapter VI - Current Proposals to Reduce FMP Cycle 
Time 
Chapter VI presents and evaluates the FMP Cycle Time Reduction 
Working Group Financial Structure Draft Proposals. Although only draft 
proposals, these initiatives help to illustrate what current efforts are being 
taken within the Department of the Navy (DoN) to restructure the FMP 
budget structure. 
7. Chapter VII - Conclusions and Recommendations 
G. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
Although several recent studies and working groups have focused on 
the FMP, many of these efforts have been from an "inside" perspective and 
have concentrated on specific components of the FMP, such as Automated 
Data Processing (ADP) systems, and not on program execution. Compiling 
the results of these studies and systematically evaluating the strengths and 
weaknesses of the current FMP budget structure from an "outside" 
perspective will establish the framework for providing unbiased 
recommendations for FMP execution improvement. Additionally, this 
research serves as a historical record of the FMP budget structure changes 
since FY 1989. 
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II. MANAGEMENT CONTROL: LINE-ITEM VERSUS LUMP-SUM 
In establishing the framework for addressing the primary research 
question, it is important to first analyze the different types of appropriations 
which have been used throughout the nation's history. Careful analysis of these 
appropriations will provide valuable insight into the factors which led to the 
. FMP budget structure changes over the past several years. Although the FMP 
was primarily lump-sum funded prior to FY 1990, distrust of the executive's 
ability to effectively manage the installation of modernization equipment 
resulted in a movement toward line-item appropriation control of the FMP 
beginning in FY 1990. 
A. LINE-ITEM VERSUS LUMP-SUM APPROPRIATIONS 
1. Background 
Since colonial times, and despite numerous congressional efforts to 
reform the budgetary system, tension still exists between the executive branch 
and Congress with respect to how much flexibility should be given to agencies to 
execute public programs funded by Congress. This tension, which clearly exists 
with control of the military purse, has focused primarily on the nature of the 
appropriations Congress passes, " .. .i.e., broad general appropriations for 
multipurposes called lump-sum appropriations versus specific appropriations 
for direct purposes called line-item appropriations." (Pitsvada, 1983, p. 83) Fisher 
puts the entire argument into perspective by stating "the choice between lump-
sum and line-item appropriations has been debated in America for at least the 
last two centuries." (Fisher, 1975, p. 59) 
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The United States' Constitution establishes the framework for control of 
spending. The Constitution states, "no Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, 
but in the Consequence of Appropriations made by Law" and adds a warning that 
"except as otherwise provided by law, sums appropriated for the various 
branches of expenditure in the public service shall be applied solely to the objects 
for which they are respectively made, and for no others." (Huzar, 1950, p. 319) 
Although this framework calls for Congress to appropriate funds, the 
executive branch has traditionally enjoyed considerable discretion as to how 
those funds are spent. Fisher states, "administrative discretion over the 
expenditure of public funds has been a fact of life since the first 
Administration .... " (Fisher, 1972, p. 110) 
Sharp partisan clashes over appropriation controls date back to the early 
years of national government. It is widely believed that the Federalists and the 
Jeffersonian Republicans differed greatly over line-item and lump-sum 
appropriations. The Federalists are generally viewed as advocates of lump-sum 
appropriations and executive spending discretion and the Jeffersonian 
Republicans as proponents of line-item and legislative control. Fisher concludes 
however, that the facts do not support such a clear cut division between the two 
camps. (Fisher, 1972, p. 110) 
Fisher explains that the first appropriation act of 1789 provided lump 
sums to four general classes of expenditures. The appropriation acts for 1790 and 
1791 also provided lump sums but with the provision that the funds were to be 
spent in accordance with estimates provided to Congress by the Secretary of the 
Treasury. In the appropriation act of December 23, 1791, Congress used a "that is 
to say" clause to further narrow executive discretion. In this appropriation act, 
" ... a little over a half million was appropriated for the military establishment -
'that is to say,' $102,686 for pay of troops, $48,000 for clothing, $4,152 for forage, 
and so forth." (Fisher, 1972, p. 111) Fisher points out that this trend continued, 
8 
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and that by 1793, appropriation acts " ... were descending to such minutiae as an 
item of $450 for firewood, stationary, printing, and other contingencies in the 
Treasurer's office." (Fisher, 1972, p. 111) From the latter examples, clearly long 
before the Jeffersonians had gained control of the Presidency, the practice of 
granting lump sums had been largely abandoned. 
After his election as President in 1801, Jefferson told Congress that it 
would be prudent to appropriate "specific sums to every specific purpose 
susceptible of definition." (Fisher, 1972, p. 111) Hamilton took quick offense to 
this remark labeling it as "preposterous." Hamilton, being a Federalist, regarded 
Jefferson's remarks as an indirect criticism of Federalist financial policies. Fisher 
concludes that Jefferson was in error on two counts, " ... first for implying that 
lump-sum appropriations had been the practice in the past, and second for 
suggesting that sums should be appropriated for every purpose susceptible of 
definition." (Fisher, 1972, p. 111) 
Jefferson's Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, recognized that it was 
impossible for Congress to foresee all the detailed fiscal requirements and 
believed that a reasonable amount of discretion should be given to the executive 
department. For example, "instead of $1,857,242 being appropriated for the War 
Department, Gallatin had simply wanted such a sum broken down into smaller 
categories- $488,076 for officers' pay and subsistence, $400,000 for ammunition 
and arms, $141,530 for clothing, and so forth." (Fisher, 1972, pp. 111-112) Fisher 
points out that there was nothing at all novel about Gallatin's suggestion; 
appropriation acts had been passed with that level of detail since December 23, 
1791. Fisher emphasizes that "Jefferson himself, as President, recognized that 
'too minute a specification has its evil as well as a too general one,' and thought 
it better for Congress to appropriate in gross while trusting in executive 
discretion." (Fisher, 1972, p. 112) Additionally, Gallatin, in an 1802 report to 
Congress, " ... cautioned against excessive subdivision of the appropriations, 
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especially in the case of the War and Navy Departments, 'beyond what is 
substantially useful and necessary."' (Fisher, 1975, p. 61) 
2. Line-Item Appropriations 
Schick argues that "budgeting in the United States is hamstrung by 
traditions developed in its infancy." (Schick, 1964, p. 100) Schick points out that 
in the early years of budgeting, emphasis was placed on ensuring complete and 
accurate accounting of expenditures and on preventing administrative abuses. 
For these reasons, Schick concludes line-item budgeting gained widespread 
acceptance. 
In carrying out their constitutional responsibilities, Congress has 
historically preferred line-item appropriations since they typically specify " ... the 
purpose, timing, and location of expenditures and allow Congress to monitor the 
spending patterns of departments and agencies within the executive branch." 
(Bixler et. al., 1992, p. 47) A good example of this preference is the fact that 
Congress requires the DoD to submit its budget largely in line-item detaiL This 
high level of detail is especially apparent in the research and development and 
procurement areas of the military where defense budget requests include a 
myriad of required program exhibits showing the item, quantity of purchase, and 
proposed cost on a line-item basis. Jones emphasizes that "with this level of ·· 
detail, subcommittee members and staff can attempt to surgically manipulate the 
DoD budget request to satisfy national security needs as well as the various 
constituent interests represented effectively by lobbyists in the highly 
decentralized congressional decision process." Oones, 1991, p. 22) 
Many defense advocates are critical of line-item appropriations because of 
the level of detail that is required to put a budget submission together and the 
amount of congressional oversight in budget execution as a result of this detail. 
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Thompson points out that Jacques Cansler denies that " ... detailed line-item 
appropriations serve any legitimate purpose whatsoever." (Thompson, 1991, p. 
62) Jones further adds that the problem with Cansler's approach to defense 
appropriations is that " .. .item-by-item budget approval is deeply rooted in the 
American constitutional order. It did not happen by accident or mistake." 
(Jones, et. al., 1994, p. 231) 
3. Lump-Sum Appropriations 
Instead of the detailed control provided by line-item appropriations, the 
President has traditionally preferred lump-sum appropriations that promote 
executive discretion and more flexibility in budget execution. Lump-sum 
appropriations also limit Congress' ability to control funds allocated to the 
executive branch or determine whether funds have been spent in compliance 
with congressional spirit and intent. (Bixler et. al., 1992, p. 47) 
Lump-sum appropriations have frequently been used in times of war and 
national depression, " ... when the crisis is great, the requirements uncertain, and 
the conditions ripe for large delegations of legislative power." (Fisher, 1975, p. 
61) During World War II, some of the lump-sum ~ppropriations were created by 
the omission of previous detailed breakdowns within the appropriations and 
others were established by "horizontal mergers" or consolidation of related, but 
previously separate appropriation titles. Huzar summarizes the use of lump-
sum appropriatio!ls during times of war by stating, "in view of its traditional 
jealousy of the purse strings, the willingness of Congress to appropriate these 
tremendous lump sums to expedite war production (and to carry on other war 
programs) can be explained only by its even greater desire to win the war." 
(Huzar, 1950, p. 327) Huzar adds "however, the process of financing the program 
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was not one of complete abdication, for Congress sought, though with only 
limited success, to retain control over expenditure of these funds." (Huzar, 1950, 
p. 327) 
Even though lump-sum appropriations promote executive discretion and 
more flexibility in budget execution, they continue to have a considerable 
amount of congressional control tied to them. Macmahon exclaims that "'lump 
sum' is hardly the term for it apart from some emergency appropriations." 
(Macmahon, 1943, p. 402) Even though the lump-sum appropriation language 
itself leaves wide administrative leeway, Macmahon emphasizes that "a crucial 
question, therefore, is the continuing force of the highly detailed preparatory 
material: the estimates, the justifications, and remarks made by the 
administrators in the hearings." (Macmahon, 1943, p. 402) 
Many of these controls, although not included in statutes, are included in 
understandings between congressional committees and the executive. Fisher 
states "administrators are subject to general statutory controls, nonstatutory 
controls exercised by the committees, and basic good-faith agreements and 
understandings with Congress." (Fisher, 1975, p. 71) Bixler adds that "lump-sum 
appropriations may include subitems that for some purposes exert the same 
control as individual line item appropriations; 'lump sum figures 
[appropriations] do not always reflect the actual scope of Presidential spending 
discretion"' (Bixler, et. al., 1992, p. 47) Even though an appropriation may be 
lump sum, the DoD is expected to follow the budget enacted by Congress which is 
derived from the DoD's itemized budget request. Bixler ~grees with Fisher's 
statement " ... 'legislative control over lump sum appropriations can be exercised 
by holding the President to his itemized budget requests, even though that 
itemization is not included in the appropriation bill"' (Bixler, et. al., 1992, p. 47) 
Bixler further adds that "this view is consistent with the mandate of the Budget 
and Accounting Act of 1921, which provided that estimates for lump-sum 
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appropriations 'shall be accompanied by statements showing, in such detail and 
form as may be necessary to inform Congress, the manner of expenditure of such 
appropriations and of the corresponding appropriations for the fiscal year in 
progress and the last completed fiscal year"' (Bixler, et. al., 1992, p. 47) 
In addition to the latter informal controls, Bixler explains that there often 
is a "moral understanding" that exists between executive agencies and Congress · 
regarding agency budgeting under lump-sum appropriations. This type of 
control depends on a "keep the faith" attitude among agency officials and a 
common trust by Congress in the integrity of administrators. A violation of this 
trust may result in budget cutbacks and increased line-item detail in 
appropriations for the offending agency. (Bixler et. al., 1992, p. 47) 
4. Analysis 
Although each type of appropriation has both strengths and weaknesses, 
studies conducted by public commissions throughout the 20th century have 
generally supported the use of lump-sum appropriations primarily due to the 
efficiency-executive orientation of the public administration school. The Taft 
Commission of 1912 concluded " ... that the constant shift toward greater 
itemization in appropriations and the limiting of discretion for an executive 
officer was based on 'the general theory that he can not be trusted."' (Fisher, 1975, 
pp. 63-64) The overall recommendation of the Taft Commission, despite the fact 
that individual members of the Commission differed on whether the latter 
conclusion was at variance with the Constitution, promoted executive discretion 
and the use of lump-sum appropriations. The Hoover Commission study in 
1949 which also promoted the use of lump-sum appropriations, ultimately 
resulted in eliminating over 200 appropriation items from the fiscal1951 budget. 
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Even with the overall momentum throughout the 20th century toward 
the use of lump-sum appropriations, military appropriations have varied. 
Huzar concludes that with respect to military appropriations, " ... there is no 
single explanation or 'rational principle' that will account for Congress' 
itemizing some military appropriations and voting others as lump sums." 
(Huzar, 1950, p. 330) Although various reasons such as constituent interests, 
desires to control departmental organization, and even fear of bureaucracy have 
contributed to Congress' choice of military appropriation controls, "distrust of 
the executive" has been and continues to be a key factor as to whether 
appropriations will be line-item or lump-sum. Regardless of whether line-item 
or lump-sum appropriations are used, Congress continues to carry out its 
constitutional responsibilities by retaining a high degree of control over the 
purse. 
B. CONGRESSIONAL MICROMANAGEMENT 
Although Congress has historically been in favor of line-item 
appropriations over lump-sum appropriations, congressional 
micromanagement of the defense budget, according to Owens, has recently 
become a pervasive problem. Owens contends that two primary factors account 
for this transition. His first factor contends that Congress itself has changed. 
Owens asserts that although "the Founders envisioned a body dedicated 
primarily to deliberation- reasoned debate on issues of broad policy ... Congress 
has come to focus instead on administration .... " (Owens, 1990, p. 141) Owens 
states that this " ... change in focus means that no detail is too small to escape the 
notice of members of Congress and their staffs." (Owens, 1990, p. 141) Owens 
further adds that this change in focus " ... has been reflected in the expansion of 
the Armed Services Committees' power to authorize every detail of the defense 
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budget." (Owens, 1990, p. 141) His second factor contends that a permanent 
antidefense bloc emerged in Congress following the Vietnam War marking the 
end of the post-World War Ii consensus on national security (Owens, 1990, p. 
141). 
Jones provides another explanation for congressional micromanagement 
of the military: 
When we raised this issue with defense expert Peter deLeon, he 
replied that we were asking the wrong question. He claimed that 
high levels of congressional attention to the details of 
administration are an inevitable consequence of the growth of 
federal spending. According to deLeon, Congress has always 
micromanaged federal spending - congressional preoccupation with 
the details of administration is ordained by the Constitution, which 
allocates to Congress the power of the purse, including the power to 
tax, to borrow, and to spend, and the power to raise and regulate 
armies .... (Jones et. al., 1994, p. 248) 
Jones continues by stating: 
Deleon concluded that congressional micromanagement is a direct 
consequence of the exercise of government's substantive powers. 
He surmised that, if the absolute level of congressional 
micromanagement was lower before World War II, it was because 
the federal budget was so much smaller. The level of 
micromanagement is higher now because the federal budget is 
much larger. (Jones et. al., 1994, p. 248) 
Jones further explains that although deLeon's thesis on the surface has 
considerable validity, it is not entirely consistent with the evidence. Jones 
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supports Huzar's conclusion that congressional attention to administrative 
details has waxed and waned throughout history: 
Although Congress has zealously guarded its de jure authority to 
specify the purposes for which it authorizes and appropriates funds 
and its authority to regulate military procurement and personnel 
policies, de facto it has often chosen not to exercise its powers. 
Rather, it has often delegated a portion of its powers to the 
executive. Gones et. al., 1994, p. 249) 
Jones emphasizes that Congress often delegates a portion of its powers to 
the executive because Congress is in a better position to deal with broad national 
issues, not managerial details. Jones summarizes that: 
As long as Congress is persuaded that the executive is willing and 
able to do what it would want done, it has often delegated authority 
to do those things to the executive. After World War II, and 
especially during the Eisenhower administration, that is precisely 
what Congress did. (Jones et. al., 1994, p. 250) 
Although Jones concludes from Huzar's survey that congressional 
micromanagement can be largely attributed to distrust of the executive, other 
students of public administration believe that congressional indignation has 
deeper roots: 
They stress the role played by the breakdown of the postwar foreign 
policy consensus in the rise of micromanagement in the 1960s and 
1970s. As Allan Schick explains, the discretion granted the 
Department of Defense during the postwar era by Congress reflected 
trust that "executive power would be applied benevolently in the 
national interest.. .. Viet Nam robbed nonpartisanship of its 
seductive hold on the loyalty of Congress .... Consequently, during 
the 1970s, Congress brought new controls into being and applied old 
controls more intensively." (Jones et. al., 1994, p. 251) 
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Based on the latter analysis, Jones is optimistic about the prospects for 
reform and adds "it implies that Congress might grant the executive the 
authority it needs to run itself in a businesslike manner- if Congress can be 
persuaded that executive branch leaders will not abuse its trust." (Jones et. al., 
1994, p. 251) Trust clearly played a role in determining what changes in the FMP 
budget structure were needed in FY 1990 to get the program back on track. 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter has taken a close look at the use of line-item and lump-sum 
appropriations to control the military purse throughout our nation's history. 
Line-item and lump-sum appropriations are no more than a form of 
management control. Control system design and implementation has 
historically been a dilemma for management. Although necessary to ensure 
compliance with the myriad of rules and regulations that exist both in 
government and in the civilian sector, the question of what, where, when, and 
in the case of human systems, whom to control needs to be constantly addressed. 
Determining what and where to control is usually much more straight forward 
than determining whom to subject to controls an4 when the controls should be 
executed. 
The process of determining how much administrative control is enough 
involves weighing the benefits against the costs of the control. Economic theory 
tells us that we will eventually reach a point where the marginal benefits of 
administrative controls equal the marginal costs of the controls. Eliminating all 
abuse, both actual and perceived, would be economically and administratively 
very impractical. Jones emphasizes that with respect to helping us avoid waste, 
controls generate substantial savings, although " .. .it must be recognized that 
controls are themselves very costly." (Jones et. al., 1994, p. 182) 
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In the next chapter the question, "what is the FMP?," will be answered. 
Although only a brief summary of this complex program from an "outside" 
perspective, Chapter III provides the reader with the necessary working 
understanding of the FMP to address the changes in the FMP budget structure 
since FY 1989 and provides the background required to begin considering current 
FMP strengths and weaknesses. 
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III. OVERVIEW OF THE FMP 
Before analyzing the changes in the FMP budget structure, it is first 
important to answer the question, "what is the FMP?". Due to its complexity, 
many of the people involved with the FMP not only do not have a good 
integrated understanding of its interrelated parts, they do not believe this 
level of understanding can be achieved. Few people involved with the FMP 
attempt to look beyond their individual piece of the puzzle. It is this 
complexity which often invokes comments such as "fragmented 
infrastructure," "lack of procedures," and "little value added." The following 
overview helps to objectively describe this complex program. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The FMP is a comprehensive program that encompasses all aspects of 
modernizing the ships of the active and reserve fleets. Comprising only a 
fraction of the Navy's procurement budget, approximately $1 billion per year, 
the FMP provides a framework for the identification of modifications 
required to increase the capability or reliability of a ship to perform its 
assigned mission and accomplishment of these modifications. Not all ship 
modifications fall under the FMP. One specific exception to the FMP includes 
modifications affecting the TRIDENT System which fall under the cognizance 
of NA VSEA (PMS 396). (OPNA VINST 4720.2G) 
In order to ensure configuration control and sound design within 
Navy ships, all FMP modernization efforts involve "alteration" documents. 
These documents provide " ... standard designs, material lists, and instructions 
for modernization accomplishment, which serve as installation guides and 
also simplify repairs, logistics support, damage control and configuration 
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control." (FMP Manual, p. EXSUM-2) FMP modifications include Ship 
Alterations (SHIPALTs), Ordnance Alterations (ORDALTs), and Machinery 
Alterations (MACHALTs). Alterations are defined as "any change in the hull, 
machinery, equipment or fittings of a ship which involves a change in 
design, materials, number, location or relationship of the component parts of 
an assembly regardless of whether it is undertaken separately from, incidental 
to or in conjunction with repairs." (OPNA VINST 4720.2G) 
Although there are numerous types of alterations in the FMP, the basic 
building block of the FMP, the Title K SHIPALT, is the most complex and 
comprises most of the modernization effort during scheduled ship 
availabilities. A Title K SHIP AL T is defined as "a permanent alteration to 
provide a military characteristic or additional capability not previously held 
by a ship affecting configuration controlled areas or systems of a ship or which 
otherwise requires the installation of HCPM." (OPNAVINST 4720.2G) Title 
K SHIPALT installations " ... consume the bulk of FMP funding and 
manpower resources and typically require extensive advance and production 
planning; assembly of materials, tools and installation support documents; 
and periods of time during which a ship is free of operational commitments." 
(FMP Manual, p. EXSUM-4) Other permanent alterations such as TitleD and 
Title F SHIP ALTS are less complex than Title K SHIP ALTS, do not affect the 
military characteristics of a ship, and are aut~ori~ed for accomplishment by 
the Fleet Commander-in-Chief (CINC). The Appendix describes the latter 
FMP SHIPALTs in more detail. This study will concentrate on the Title K 
SHIP AL T since an understanding of the Title K SHIP AL T process is critical to 
understanding the FMP process. 
The FMP consists of an integrated multi-year schedule of equipment 
procurement and installation on designated ships based on prioritized lists of 
ship alterations by ship class. This integrated plan is developed and 
programmed by OPNA V based on inputs from CINCs, Type Commanders 
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(TYCOMs), NAVSEA, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), and Space 
and Naval Warfare Command (SPAWAR). Other FMP components include 
engineering design services, program design services, and program support 
required for program execution. FMP funding is programmed by OPNA V 
Resource Sponsors based on requirements identified by Hardware Systems 
Commands (HSCs), Life Cycle Equipment Managers (LCEMs), or Ship's 
Program Managers (SPMs). (OPNA VINST 4720.2G) 
Although the FMP is a CNO program, NA VSEA has overall 
responsibility for planning and execution of the FMP in accordance with 
OPNA VINST 4720.2G. All Systems Commands are responsible for managing 
and executing procurement of FMP material under their cognizance. 
Additionally, SPAWAR and NAVAIR are responsible for preparing FMP 
budget inputs. 
B. COMPONENTSOFTHEFMP 
It is convenient to describe the components of the FMP on the basis of 
how they are budgeted. The FMP can be easily broken down into four cost 
elements. These elements include procurement of Headquarters Centrally 
Provided Material (HCPM), Title K SHIP ALI installation funding and 
advance planning funding, Design Services Allocation (DSA), and Alteration 
Installation Team (AIT) and program support. 
1. Procurement of HCPM 
HCPM required for modernization efforts is provided by the 
responsible Systems Command Life Cycle Equipment Managers 
(LCEMs)/Participating Managers (PARMs) with Other Procurement, Navy 
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(OPN), Weapons Procurement, Navy (WPN), and Aircraft Procurement, 
Navy (APN) funds in the appropriate P-1 equipment line (subhead). 
Subheads are used primarily for administration, accounting, and control of an 
appropriation. These funds are budgeted in the budget FY necessary to 
accommodate procurement lead time and delivery to the installation site in 
order to be available for the planned installation. The Systems Command 
LCEMs/PARMs are also responsible for developing and budgeting their 
portion of the FMP budget which includes estimating total procurement costs 
and accurately timing procurements to meet installation schedules. 
2. Title K SHIP AL T Installation Funding 
Title K SHIP ALT installation funding covers both the installation and 
advance planning of a specific modification. Advance planning (long range 
efforts preceding installation) includes such items as prefabrication, issue of 
plans and job orders, and identification and purchase of required incidental 
material. Advance planning funding is required e~rlier than installation 
funding and therefore is budgeted in the budget FYs in which advance 
planning efforts will be required, in the same P-1 equipment line as the major 
equipment procurement and all other installation funds for the installation. 
Installation funds for Title K SHIPALTs which require HCPM are budgeted in 
the appropriate procurement appropriation, in the same P-1 equipment line 
as the major equipment in the year in which the installation requirement 
exists. When HCPM is not required for a Title K SHIPALT, installation and 
advance planning is budgeted and funded in Operations and Maintenance, 
Navy (O&MN) in the budget FYs required. (FMP Manual, pp. EXSUM-7-8) 
In FY 1993, Director, Space and Electronic Warfare (N6) was given 
installation programming and fiscal responsibility for Communications, 
Command, and Control (C3) procurements funded by N6. Prior to this 
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change, installation sponsorship for C3 alterations resided with N86, N87, and 
Director, Air Warfare Division (N88): "incorporated in this decision is a 
change to FMP policy that states research and development, procurement and 
installation funding for an equipment program will reside in only one 
organization." (N80 memo dated 13 October 1992) This shift in responsibility 
gave N6 an active voice in the FMP even though NA VSEA retained overall 
responsibility for planning and execution of the FMP. 
3. Design Services Allocation (DSA) 
DSA funds: 
... most SHIP ALT design products and efforts, as well as changes 
to configuration control documents, logistics documents and 
operating procedures that result from SHIPALT installations, 
and Planning Yard costs associated with these efforts ... The key 
test of legitimacy of an FMP DSA requirement is that it must be 
an effort directly related to a SHIPALT design effort or product, 
or a configuration control documentation effort that is a direct 
response to the impact of a SHIP ALT installation. (FMP Manual, 
p. EXSUM-8) 
DSA efforts are budgeted and funded in O&MN regardless of the source of 
procurement or installation funding. 
4. Alteration Installation Team (AIT) and Program Support 
This component of the FMP includes the remaining FMP efforts such 
as installation of Title K SHIPALTS scheduled outside of scheduled depot-
level availabilities, those installed by AITs, special modernization efforts 
directed by AITs, and special modernization efforts directed by CNO Warfare 
Sponsors. Installation costs for this component of the FMP fall under the 
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same funding rules that apply to Title K SHIPALT installations. 
Additionally, program support includes ADP elements of the FMP. 
a. Automated Data Processing (ADP) Support 
ADP support is in tum comprised of three separate but 
interconnected systems which include FMPMIS, SABRES, and SAFE. 
FMPMIS is a mainframe-based distribution system which is used for planning 
all aspects of the FMP: "all elements of the FMP must be resident in the 
FMPMIS database if they are to be considered in the planning, programming 
and execution processes." (FMP Manual, p. 6-13) FMPMIS includes such data 
as SHIP ALT information, prioritization decisions of the CNO Platform 
Sponsors, ship availability schedules, FMP material requirements for 
SHIPALTS, and the "approved" results of the CNO Platform Sponsors' 
programming of Title K SHIPALTS into specific availability packages (FMP 
Manual, p. 6-13). FMP policy states that "FMPMIS is the only sanctioned 
authoritative source of information for all activities to use in carrying out 
their responsibilities under this instruction, and therefore must reflect the 
most current and complete modernization information." (OPNA VINST 
4720.2G) 
SABRES is a PC-based system which is utilized exclusively by the 
CNO Platform Sponsors, SPMs, and NAVSEA and whose " ... primary 
purpose is to allow CNO Platform Sponsors to manipulate data downloaded 
from FMPMIS, into discrete Title K SHIP ALT availability packages, fully 
costed, in order to finalize their respective FMP budgets, matching the 
available dollars and their highest priority program elements." (FMP 
Manual, p. 6-13) SABRES allows this "gaming" process to proceed without 





by CNO, it is uploaded into FMPMIS so that both FMPMIS and SABRES 
reflect the most recent CNO approved program. (FMP Manual, p. 6-13) 
SAFE is a PC-based financial execution and tracking system 
which is used by NA VSEA and the SPMs. The approved FMP is loaded into 
SAFE and SAFE is then used to account for all FMP financial transactions, 
communicate execution year obligation plan data between NA VSEA and the 
SPMs, and create all FMP funding documents. (FMP Manual, p .. EXSUM-12) 
C. FMP PROCESSES 
The entire FMP can be broken down into a combination of separate 
processes. These processes include SHIP AL T development, FMP program 
development, Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) /budget 
development, and program execution. 
1. SHIPALTDevelopment 
Proposed improvements to ships and their equipment/ systems can 
originate from sources both inside and outside the Navy: These proposed 
improvements can either be military, survivability, or technical 
improvements. Once received, the proposals are categorized and evaluated 
for possible inclusion in the FMP; military and survivability proposals are 
submitted to the appropriate CNO Platform Sponsor for approval and 
technical proposals are submitted to the appropriate SPM for approval. 
Once approved, proposals are forwarded to the appropriate SPM for 
development of the Justification Cost Form (JCF). The JCF is used by the SPM 
and the Change Control Board (CCB) to determine whether to proceed with 
full SHIP ALT development. The JCF identifies the SHIP ALT justification, 
critical material requirements, initial installation cost estimate, and applicable 
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ship classes. After approval by the SPM and after the decision has been made 
by OPNAV to program and fund the SHIPALT, the SPM enters the SHIPALT 
into FMPMIS and determines whether to task a Ship Alteration Record 
(SAR). (FMP Manual, pp. EXSUM-13 - 14) 
The SAR is class-specific and more detailed than the JCF. The SAR 
contains specific material requirements, refined cost estimates, ship impacts, 
ship system interfaces, Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) impacts, 
sketches, and required removals. SARs are usually developed by the 
Planning Yards and funded from DSA. The Planning Yards which can be 
either public or private, work closely with the SPMs during SHIP ALT 
development. (FMP Manual, p. EXSUM-14) 
Upon approval of the SAR by the SPM, the SPM tasks the Planning 
Yard to develop SHIPALT Installation Drawings (SIDs) which are ship specific 
to the first ship scheduled to receive the SHIP ALT. SIDs are also funded by 
DSA and are a collection of several drawings and data packages necessary for 
the accomplishment of the installation of the SHIP ALT. (FMP Manual, p. 
EXSUM-14) 
2. FMP Pr~gram Development 
The FMP program development process begins with the Joint Mission 
Area GMA) /Support Area (SA) assessment process: 
The assessment process is designed to link the Navy-Marine 
Corps capabilities with the Mission and Support areas in a joint 
environment. The assessment teams are chaired by Navy Flag 
or Marine Corps General Officers; they provide a broad view of 
senior officers from across OPNAV, while bringing special 
warfare expertise and experience to the assessment process. The 
teams also include Fleet Commanders in Chief (CINCs) and 
representatives from Headquarters, Marine Corps. 
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The assessment process results are then integrated into a single 
investment strategy .... The objective of the Navy's integrated 
investment strategy is to provide coordinated planning that will 
ensure that the Navy is capable to carry out its mission in the 
future. (Ennis et. al., 1995, p. 4-3- 4) 
Future modernization efforts for the Navy are the direct result of shortfalls in 
capability identified in the assessment process. The Navy's primary review 
forum, the Integrated Resource and Requirements Review Board (IR3B), 
establishes direction and provides guidance on the assessment process 
recommendations (Ennis et. al., 1995, p. 4-4). 
Based on the macro modernization requirements identified during the 
assessment process, the individual OPNA V Resource Sponsors which 
include N6, Director, Expeditionary Warfare Division (N85), N86, N87, and 
N88 identify individual and groups of alterations which meet the 
modernization requirements. The Resource Sponsors prioritize these lists of 
alterations based upon recommendations of the CINCs, TYCOMs, and 
NA VSEA SPMs. 
The Resource Sponsor prioritized alteration lists are submitted to the 
Ships Characteristic Improvement Panel (SCIP) FMP Working Group during 
an annual FMP Conference for approval and integration into an overall 
OPNA V ship modernization priority. Depending on the approval and 
priority assigned by the SCIP, the Resource Sponsors proceed to program 
alterations using FMPMIS and SABRES during the POM process. 
Additionally, resource sponsors also program DSA, alteration installation 
programs, and AITs and program support utilizing SABRES. The end 
product of the FMP program development process " .. .is an integrated 
program of equipment procurement, authorized alterations, design and 
logistics support which install the authorized system and equipment 
improvements to the Navy's ships and service craft. A balanced program 
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requires coordination of funding, alteration design development, equipment 
procurement (as required) and accomplishment." (OPNA VINST 4720.2G) 
3. POM/Budget Development 
FMP planning is conducted in accordance with the normal Navy 
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) process. The Deputy 
Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements, and 
Assessments) (N8) coordinates " ... the overall planning and programming of 
ship modernization efforts among the OPNAV resource sponsors through all 
phases of Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) and budget 
development." (OPNAVINST 4720.2G) 
"POM" is both a process and a product. The POM process which begins 
every other October (even numbered FYs) produces the Navy's submission of 
the six-year Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP) to the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD). The FYDP is a "snapshot of requirements." The budget 
process takes the FYDP and refines the closest two years into operating 
budgets and "if a modernization effort does not appear in the POM and the 
budget, it is unlikely that it will appear in an approved FMP." (FMP Manual, 
p. 6-17) 
Based upon priorities established by the SCIP FMP Working Group, 
during the POM process, the OPNA V Resource Sponsors program resources 
for the accomplishment of alterations (including equipment and design) on 
an individual hull during a specific maintenance availability as part of 
Sponsor Program Proposals (SPPs). Resource Sponsors also program 
resources for DSA and ILS as required to support installation plans. The FMP 
funded portion of the budget includes only approved alterations, design, and 
logistics support. (OPNA VINST 4720.2G) 
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4. Program Execution 
NA VSEA serves as the II ••• execution coordinator for FMP ship 
alteration installation plan and has overall responsibility for the technical 
development and approval of alterations." (OPNA VINST 4720.2G) 
NAVSEA executes each CNO Platform Sponsor's program by FY and P-1line 
in the FMP budget. Figure 1 graphically depicts FMP funding during 
execution for Title K alterations. 
Prior to the start of each FY, NAVSEA, in conjunction with the SPMs, 
develops the Execution Management Plan (EMP). The EMP, a financial 
obligation plan which reflects each OPNAV Resource Sponsor's approved 
program/budget and the expected allocation of obligational authority to 
NA VSEA, is entered into SAFE as the baseline for FMP execution. Once this 
baseline has been established, 11 ••• all SPMs and AIT /Program Support 
Managers are responsible for submitting official funding requests, requesting 
funding document creation and approval consistent with the dates and 
values in the EMP." (FMP Manual, p. 6-20) 
Throughout. execution, program size can vary since the approved FMP 
is based solely on cost estimates: 
To accommodate these differences between estimates and actual 
costs, a separate account is maintained for each CNO Platform 
Sponsor and SPM, named the Earned Variance (EV) account. 
Ideally, costs above estimates may be balanced out by costs below 
estimates within these accounts. If this is not the case, Escrow 
Changes must be approved to keep the program in balance with 
the budget ... One major opportunity exists for budget 
adjustments during execution, during the annual May-June 
Mid-Year Review, at which time claimants submit unfunded 
requirements for consideration, for which other funds may then 
be made available to the FMP from NA VCOMPT. (FMP 





































FMP FUNDING (EXECUTION) FORK ALTERATIONS 
OPN EQUIPf BY P-1 
....---------
. SPA WAR EQUIPT 
~----
SPA WAR INSTLN FUNDING BY P-1 SPA WAR PMW'S 
.... 














N6 SPA WAR '-...... OPN INSTALL BY P-1 •PROVIDE EQUIPMENT DESIGN 
f \ .... ILS FUNDS ESCROW M N (DSA) •FUND EQUIPMENT rCH_!-.!'l_?~O& ' .... INSTALLATION DESIGN •FUND DESIGN FUNDS •PREP ARE SIDS 
-c:::r- DESIGN 
COORDINATION I SEA 03 PARM PEO FUNDS 
--c:::::>- OPN/WPN EQUIPf .... ' ' L /BYP-1/SPONSOR •BUY HEADQUARTERS 
EQUIPMENT NAVSEA 






I I I PLANNING CONTRJr" ::c:::s= YARDS CHANGES OPN/WPN INSTL COORDINATION •PREPARE/ ~- - - - - . O&M,N (DSA & INSTL) --c:::::>- APPROVE SIDS ··~ 
BY P-1 SPONSOR SPM 
•FUND DESIGN, ILS, SUPPORTING 
OPN/APNINSTALL .... A/P,INSTALLATION ACTIVITIES 
/BY P-1 -c:::r-
.__ 
COORDINATION AlP & INSTLN FUNDS 
N8 NA V AIR --c::::>- FOR NA V AIR & NA VSEA BY P-1 
CASH \ NAVAIRPARM 
ADJUST-OPN/APN EQUIPf .... 





INSTALLATION •BUY HDQTRS EQUIPT 
•PROVIDE EQUIPT ILS 
NA V AIR EQUIPf 
a. Reprogramming 
NA VSEA must ensure that increases to individual P-1 lines do 
not exceed the reprogramming threshold of $10 million in any given FY. 
Once this threshold is exceeded, reprogramming requests must be submitted 
to Congress for approval. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter has answered the question, "what is the FMP?". The latter 
overview clearly depicts a complex and highly "fragmented" program. The 
material for this chapter was compiled from numerous sources. When 
summarized in this fashion, the FMP actually makes sense. The problem 
however, is that outside of some readily available sources such as 
OPNA VINST 4720.2G and the FMP Manual, much of this information is not 
formalized or written down in any one place. Many of the people working in 
the FMP often refer to this "lack of procedures" when openly expressing their 
views of the FMP. 
In the next chapter, the changes in the FMP budget structure since FY 
1989 will be addressed. These changes closely parallel the line-item and 
lump-sum material presented in Chapter II. 
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IV. BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS OF CHANGES TO THE 
FMP BUDGET STRUCTURE SINCE FY 1989 
Chapter IV systematically analyzes the FMP budget structure changes 
since FY 1989 by incorporating knowledge of the different types of 
appropriations with an integrated understanding of the FMP. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Since FY 1989, a series of FMP Appropriation changes has resulted in 
each budget year FMP being budgeted and executed differently. These 
changes were initiated to ensure that procured equipment for modifications 
was actually being installed, and to improve the accountability of total system 
end-item costs in the budget. 
1. Prior to FY 1990 
Prior to FY 1990, equipment installation costs were budgeted in 
Operations and Maintenance, Navy /Navy Reserve (O&MN /R) 
Appropriations. There were three lines of accounting data with the funding 
split between the three Platform Sponsors which included N86, N87, and 
N88 (formally OP-03, 02, and 05 respectively). 
HCPM for the FMP was procured with OPN, WPN, and APN funds by 
System Command LCEMs/PARMs for the equipment involved in whatever 
budget FY necessary for the equipment to be ready for installation in the FY of 
the installation. Other costs associated with modernization efforts were 
budgeted in O&MN /R by the SPMs in the budget FY in which the 
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modification was to start, or in the budget FY the ship's modernization 
availability was to begin. (FMP Manual, p. EXSUM-3) 
Since O&MN/R FMP installation funds were essentially in a lump 
sum, there was not a close funding linkage between the HCPM and the 
installation of this material. Due to operational commitments often taking 
precedence over modernization efforts, procured material frequently did not 
get installed in the budget FY planned and sometimes never got installed due 
to the material either becoming obsolete by the time the ship was available for 
modification or the ship ultimately being decommissioned before the 
material could be installed. For example, prior to FY 1990, a sonar upgrade 
that was deferred due to operational commitments might have never got 
installed because a newer and more capable system had replaced it by the time 
the ship was available for modification. 
Compounding the latter problem, O&MN /R FMP funds were 
frequently "diverted" to fund "emergencies"(higher priority programs) 
raising the likelihood of unfunding other modernization installation efforts. 
The end result was a large amount of HCPM being installed significantly after 
the FY it was budgeted to be installed or not being installed at all. 
B. FY 1990 - 1992 
1. Full Funding 
a. Background 
In FY 1989, in an effort to correct the equipment/installation 
mismatch, the OSD proposed to Congress to move funds for installing 
"modernization" equipment from the operations appropriations to 
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investment appropriations. Congress was receptive to this change only if 
funding for the installation of modernization equipment was tied to 
equipment procurement. With the enactment of the FY 1990 budget, 
Congress directed that all FMP costs be budgeted in the procurement 
appropriations, OPN, WPN, and APN. The following excerpt from the FY 
1990 Conference Report of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees 
details this direction: 
The conferees agree with the Senate proposal to follow the full 
funding policies of the Department of Defense and show the cost 
of installing equipment required to modernize existing forces as 
part of the acquisition of equipment. Heretofore, the 
Department has budgeted these costs on an incremental basis in 
the Operation and Maintenance accounts, requesting only those 
amounts required to accomplish current year installations. Thus 
the acquisition costs of the end items were understated. (House 
Report 101-345, p. 58) 
This congressional direction clearly included a movement away 
from lump-sum appropriation control of the FMP and toward line-item 
appropriation control: 
The conferees agree that beginning with the fiscal year 1991 
budget request, these costs should be budgeted by individual line 
item in procurement. The request should separately identify 
both the cost of the item to be procured and the cost of installing 
the item. (House Report 101-345, pp. 58-59) 
Additionally, the FY 1990 Conference Report of the Senate and 
House Appropriations Committees directed the Department of the Navy " ... to 
submit a report to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations on 
any difficulties encountered implementing this change in the Other 
Procurement, Navy appropriation account." (House Report 101-345, p. 59) 
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Congress believed that with different appropriations there was 
not sufficient accountability of total system end-item costs in the budget, and 
that an insufficient link between procurement and installation existed which 
allowed material to be procured but not installed. The "full funding" concept 
required that FMP installation costs be budgeted in the same Budget Activity, 
P-1line (subhead) and in the same budget FY as the procurement of the 
HCPM itself regardless of when the modernization effort was to commence. 
The "full funding" policy change was " ... to allow for the full cost of ship 
systems and modernization to be assessed during the review of these Navy 
procurement appropriations, and to ensure that HCPM will not be procured 
for installation without sufficient funds being available as well." (FMP 
Manual, p. 6-3) The discipline provided by "full funding" would hopefully 
alleviate the excessive and unmanageable buildup of modification kits 
awaiting installation. 
b. Budget Authority - Outlay Mismatch Problem 
In addition to the OSD' s desire to correct the 
equipment/installation mismatch problem, an underlying theme leading 
into the OSD' s proposal to shift to the "full funding" co:ncept in FY 1990 was 
the ongoing dispute over differences between the way the DoD and the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scored outlay estimates. With deficit 
reduction becoming increasingly important, outlays, which directly affect the 
deficit, were being closely monitored. In the FY 1990 defense budget, the 
Pentagon identified over $3 billion of "methodology" differences between the 
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way the DoD and the CBO estimated outlays. The Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF), Dick Cheney, in a letter to Senator Jim Sasser, Chairman, 
Committee on the Budget United States Senate, stated: 
I am concerned that decisions may be made during the 
authorization and appropriation process which will be 
disruptive to the Defense programs without really contributing 
to the deficit reduction goal. I urge you and your committee to 
recognize limitations that exist in accurately forecasting outlays 
and to avoid potentially damaging changes to the Defense 
programs based on these estimates. (SECDEF, Letter dated 6 June 
1989) 
Part of the difference between the DoD and the CBO outlay 
estimates was due to the CBO applying their outlay rates to Budget Authority 
and the DoD applying rates to Total Obligational Availability (direct Program 
and Reimbursable Program). Of the five critical areas of technical difference 
between the DoD and the CBO outlay scoring identified by the Pentagon, "the 
major differences involve CBO (1) not reflecting historical experience when 
determining their O&M first year outlay rates ($2.1 billion); (2) not 
considering all relevant factors concerning the stock funds ($1.0 billion); and 
(3) assigning identical outlay rates to the major Military Personnel 
appropriations even though historical trends reflect different outlay profiles 
($.3 billion)." (SECDEF, Letter dated 6 June 1989) 
Sean O'Keefe, Comptroller of the Department of Defense, in a 
letter to Senator Pete Domenici stated that "the FY 1990 outlay difference 
between CBO and DoD, while small in percentage terms, is large enough in 
absolute terms to warrant a comprehensive review of our respective 
methodologies with the idea of adopting a single approach to estimating 
outlays for the FY 1991 and future budgets." (O'Keefe, Letter dated 19 July 
1989) While understanding the need to ultimately reconcile differences 
between the DoD and the CBO outlay estimates, in the short term for FY 1990, 
37 
DoD proposed to shift some of the installation expenditures in the FY 1990 
defense budget from O&M to procurement. In a memo to Senator Domenici, 
Senate staffer Dick Doyle referenced this shift by stating: 
DoD would get an additional $1.1 billion in outlay savings from 
this procedure. The rationale is that it makes sense to consider 
the installation costs as procurement where the installation 
occurs in the same year as the procurement of the parts to be 
installed. So far CBO is inclined to accept this maneuver despite 
the argument that a shift of this kind is theoretically outlay 
neutral. If someone makes a stink about it, they may change 
their mind. (Doyle, Memo dated 23 June 1989) 
This realignment of funds helped to alleviate a good portion of the difference 
between the DoD and the CBO outlay estimates for FY 1990. 
c. Implementation 
In order to make the transition to "full funding," Congress 
transferred $1.9 billion from O&M app:t:opriations to procurement 
appropriations in FY 1990 to fund the installation of HCPM equipment 
planned to be installed in FY 1990. Additionally, Congress transferred $3.0 
billion to fund the installation of equipment procured but not planned for 
installation until subsequent fiscal years (House Report 101-345, p. 59). This 
"Installation of Prior Year Equipment" (OPN /WPN) which had a three year 
obligational authority, was extended in FY 1992 for an additional year. 
Although Congress believed that difficulties experienced in achieving 
obligations before appropriation expiration were largely due to insufficient 
and inadequate management attention, Congress did recognize that " ... during 
the first year of implementation of the new funding policy (fiscal year 1990) 
some legitimate problems were and continue to be encountered." 
(Congressional Record, 1991, p. H10474) Additional language in the 
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testimony leading up to the 1992 Conference Report of the Senate and House 
Appropriations Committee stated: 
The conference provision includes a one-time, one-year 
extension for fiscal year 1990 procurement appropriations only 
for the installation of equipment for which procurement 
obligations were made before the appropriation expired .... The 
conferees expect that this provision will not have to be repeated 
in future years. (Congressional Record, 1991, p. H10474) 
Despite the language used in the testimony leading up to the FY 
. 1992 Conference Report of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees, 
the obligational authority of FY 1990 "Installation of Prior Year Equipment" 
was again extended for an additional year in the FY 1993 Defense 
Appropriations Bill which stated, " ... that during the current fiscal year and 
the following fiscal year, additional obligations may be incurred under fiscal 
year 1990 procurement appropriations for the installation of equipment when 
obligations were incurred during the period of availability of such 
appropriations for the procurement of such equipment but obligations for the 
installation of such equipment were not able to be incurred before the 
expiration of the period of availability of such appropriations." (Public Law 
102-396,Sec.9034) 
In addition to "Installation of Prior Year Equipment," "full 
funding" provided "Modernization Support" OPN funds to fund all efforts 
not associated with specific equipment installations such as SHIP ALT design, 
configuration control documentation, program ADP support, etc. With the 
exception of the transition year, FY 1990, in which the FMP was only executed 
under "full funding," the FMP was both budgeted and executed under "full 
funding" in FY 1991 and 1992. By FY 1992, it became apparent to the Navy 
that problems were starting to develop with FMP execution due to "full 
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funding." With less flexibility provided by the line-item control, the Navy 
was having trouble with execution of the FMP. 
d. Difficulties Encountered Implementing Full 
Funding 
In response to the direction provided in the FY 1990 Conference 
Report of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees, the Secretary of 
the Navy (SECNAV), on 22 July 1991, submitted a letter to Congress which 
outlined the difficulties encountered implementing the "full funding" FMP 
change. The three specific problem areas identified included equipment lead 
time, accuracy of budget estimates, and loss of flexibility. 
Due to the long lead times associated with modernization 
equipment, the three year obligational authority of procurement funds was a 
primary concern to the Navy since "installations of ship alterations typically 
do not occur for a minimum of three years after funds have been made 
available and, in the case of exceptionally complex alterations, may not occur 
for up to five years or more." (SECNAV, Letter dated 22 July 1991) If 
procurement lead times exceeded three years or lengthy equipment lead times 
coupled with ship operational commitments pushed the modification time 
line past three years, the Navy could potentially be left with millions of 
dollars of modernization equipment with no funds for installation. 
(SECNAV, Letter dated 22 July 1991) 
Another difficulty encountered with "full funding" 
implementation was the accuracy of budget estimates. With the characteristic 
long lead times of modernization equipment, it was difficult to accurately 
predict such factors as shipyard workload and inflation on manday rates. 
Ship operational schedule changes compounded the estimate process by 
potentially changing not only the FY of the modernization availability but the 
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actual location of the availability. Additionally, since modification designs 
are tailored to specific ships and ship classes and are normally not complete 
until one year before the modification is scheduled, budget estimates under 
the "full funding" concept were being developed far in advance of design 
completion. (SECNAV, Letter dated 22 July 1991) 
The third "full funding" implementation problem was a lack of 
flexibility in executing approved programs; a problem which was directly 
related to the accuracy of budget estimates. Inaccurate estimates could lead to 
transfers of funds between line items and "when the requirement for these 
transfers exceeds reprogramming thresholds, formal notification of the 
Defense oversight committees will be required, greatly increasing the 
administrative workload on both the committees and the DoN." (SECNAV, 
Letter dated 22 July 1991) SECNAV concluded his letter by stating: 
The Navy is committed to implementing the new policy of 
including costs of installation as an element of fully funding 
procurement. At a minimum, this will require extension of 
obligation authority and some mechanism to increase flexibility 
during execution. (SECNAV, Letter dated 22 July 1991) 
e. FY 1992 Rescission 
Frustrated with the DoD's ability to effectively manage the 
installation of modifications, Congress, in early FY 1992, rescinded $330 
million in FY 1990 through FY 1992 OPN funds for installing modernization 
equipment. As outlined in the SECNAV's letter, from the Navy's 
perspective, the problem continued to be largely caused by the long lead times 
associated with modernization equipment which in turn resulted in an 
inability to obligate funds before they expired (House Report 102-530, pp. 27-
28). This action, coupled with Congress' refusal to lift the obligation limit for 
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installation funding, rendered the "full funding" approach unworkable for 
modification equipment which could not be procured and installed within 
the three year obligational authority period. With modification equipment 
beginning to accumulate again, the DoD and the DoN turned to the budget 
structure to resolve the problem. 
C. FY 1993 TO THE PRESENT 
1. Annualization of Installation Costs 
a. Background 
Due to the growing number of execution problems caused by 
"full funding," the recent $330 million in rescissions, and Congress' 
reluctance to extend the obligational authority of installation funds with the 
exception of extending the obligational authority of FY 1990 "Installation of 
Prior Year Equipment" funds one year at a time, the Navy persuaded DoD 
and ultimately Congress to annualize installation costs starting in FY 1994. 
"Annualization" involved budgeting installation costs on an "as needed" 
basis in the FY the modification was actually required rather than in the FY of 
the initial equipment procurement. Although the FY 1994 Defense 
Appropriations Bill reflected the "annualization" concept, Congress 
reluctantly accepted DoD's argument for the change. 
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The following excerpts from the FY 1994 Senate Appropriations 
Committee Report discuss this reluctance and the background of 
the" annualization" change: 
The Committee has been informed by the Defense Department 
that in some cases managers are unable to order and take 
delivery of a modification kit and have the kit installed within 
the 3-year statutory limitation of the affected procurement 
accounts. The Committee is not able to understand why, in 
most circumstances, this has been the case. (Senate Report 103-
153, p. 109) 
The Naval Nuclear Program was one of the Navy's hardest hit areas as a 
result of the "full funding" change. Due to the unusually long lead times for 
nuclear components (typically three to five years), over 90% of nuclear 
installations were falling outside the three year OPN limitation. Even 
though Congress attributed a lot of the execution problems to inadequate 
management attention, Congress did acknowledge that there was a problem 
and reluctantly agreed to the "annualization" change: 
The Committee continues to believe that the current policy is 
the appropriate method to manage modification installations. 
Reluctantly, the Committee agrees to support the new approach 
offered by DoD, with minor modifications. (Senate Report 103-
153, pp. 109-110) 
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Additional language in the FY 1994 Senate Appropriations 
Committee Report detailed the "minor modifications" which primarily 
involved budget presentation: 
The Committee directs that the Defense Department inform the 
Congress of the total cost of installing each kit to be purchased 
and display, by program, the fiscal years in which the installation 
funds will be requested. In addition, the justification 
documentation for modification programs shall specify by fiscal 
year the installation costs for those kits which have already been 
provided. (Senate Report 103-153, p. 110) 
The FY 1994 Senate Appropriations Committee Report concluded by stating 
that the " ... funds requested and appropriated for installation costs are 
available only for installing the specific equipment for which the funds were . 
appropriated." (Senate Report 103-153, pp. 109-110) 
Language in the FY 1994 Conference Report of the Senate and 
House Appropriations Committees reemphasized Congress' reluctance to 
accept the "annualization" change: 
The conferees agree with the Senate report on policy and 
procedures for budgeting for the installation of modifications. 
Specifically, the conferees reluctantly agree t9 the budget 
proposal to incrementally fund these costs in procurement. 
(House Report 103-339, p. 78) 
b. Transition 
Program Budget Decision No. 156, dated 11 December 1992, 
outlined the FMP shift to "annualization" starting in FY 1994. A 9 November 
1992 memo from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial 
Management to the Comptroller of the Department of Defense concerning 
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PBD No. 156 explained the Department of the Navy's position on 
"annualization" of installation funding: 
It has the benefit of better matching equipment and installations 
to dynamic ship maintenance schedules. It is not restricted to 
three - or five-year funding availabilities and therefore will 
neither result in unexecuted obligations or await the improbable 
extension of funding availabilities by the Congress. Neither will 
the Congress be able to tap into any unobligated funds like they 
did this past year when they rescinded $330 million and created 
an unfunded deficiency you are now required to pay out of 
existing DoD resources. 
The memo continued by emphasizing: 
... we continue to budget for the equipment installation in the 
appropriate procurement line item, allowing management 
visibility and control in budgeting and execution. This approach 
will maintain the focus between equipment and installation 
both from a management as well as a budget review perspective. 
(ASN, Memo dated 9 November 1992) 
Prior to finalization of PBD No. 156, the Navy had submitted its 
FY 1994 FMP budget to the DoD in an annualized format. The Navy applied 
the "annualization" concept to all equipment installation, "Modernization 
Support," and "Installation of Prior Year" P-1lines for FY 1990 through FY 
1995 budget years. The FY 1994 budget control was zeroed due to savings from 
prior-year fully funded appropriation controls. The DoN' s intent was to 
transition to an "annualized" FMP in FY 1994 and start with a fully 
"annualized" FMP beginning in FY 1995. 
PBD No. 156 approved the Navy's request to "annualize" 
installation funds and directed the Navy to use the savirigs from the shift to 
"anriualization" to fund FY 1990/1991/1992 installation shortfalls. 
Additionally, PBD No. 156 directed that "Modernization Support" funds be 
transferred from the OPN appropriation to the O&MN appropriation. 
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O&MN funds would now be used to fund such items as SHIP ALT advance 
planning and installation efforts, both in and out of scheduled availabilities, 
which do not install HCPM and for annual costs for management 
information systems, engineering and technical planning documentation, as 
well as ship configuration documentation updates following the installation 
of modifications (SEA 01P, Memo dated 2 September 1994). 
The shift of "Modernization Support" funds from OPN to 
O&MN " ... was a result of an OSD determination that these requirements 
should not be in the procurement appropriations since they did not relate to 
an end-item installation." (FMP Manual, p. EXSUM-4) Although the Navy 
complied with the directed fund shift, the Navy believed that: 
Keeping these funds in the same appropriation is beneficial since 
they support necessary design, advance planning and ship 
alterations which are basically conjunctive with planned ship 
availabilities for which specific equipment is being procured in 
OPN. If placed in the O&M world, these funds could be subject 
to the same diversions for other emergent requirements we 
have seen in the past. (ASN, Memo dated 9 November 1992} 
This shift was essentially a move back toward lump-sum control. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter has taken a comprehensive look at the changes in the 
FMP budget structure since FY 1989. Incorporating a knowledge of the 
different types of appropriations with an understanding of the FMP, one can 
observe that the FMP budget structure has varied between lump-sum and 
line-item appropriation control. Where Congress has traditionally preferred 
more FMP funding control through the use of line-item appropriations, the 
DoD and DoN have preferred more flexibility through the use of lump-sum 
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appropriations. Although "full funding" changes in FY 1990 were line-item 
in nature, their inflexibility in certain situations has prompted the recent 
movement back toward more lump-sum control of the FMP; a movement 
which has been recommended by the DoD and DoN and reluctantly accepted 
by Congress. 
In the next chapter, an overview of the TRIDENT modernization 
program will be presented followed by an evaluation of the strengths and 




V. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE FMP AND 
TRIDENT MODERNIZATION PROGRAM 
In order to objectively evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the 
current FMP budget structure, it is important to examine another highly 
successful modernization program. This program, the TRIDENT 
modernization program, has a completely different budget structure which 
unlike the FMP, is largely lump-sum funded through a single Program Office. 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE TRIDENT MODERNIZATION 
PROGRAM 
1. Introduction 
TRIDENT modifications are an integral part of the whole TRIDENT 
configuration management scheme. In contrast to the FMP, modifications 
are considered on a "platform" basis instead of on an "equipment" basis. 
TRIDENT is a "cradle to grave" program which is managed and funded 
through the Strategic Submarine Program Office, NA VSEA (PMS 396), in 
conjunction with the Director, Strategic Systems Programs (DIRSSP). The 
TRIDENT System Change Management Plan which runs through the life 
cycle of the submarine includes not only the submarine itself, but also the 
shore based training, refit, and test and evaluation facilities. The only items 
excluded from this plan are the strategic weapons system and nuclear 
propulsion. 
TRIDENT utilizes two specialized and dedicated TRIDENT Refit 
Facilities (TRFs), one at Naval Submarine Base, Silverdale Washington, and 
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the other at Naval Submarine Base, Kings Bay, Georgia. With the exception 
of extensive alteration work requiring an extended availability or overhaul in 
a shipyard, TRFs conduct the majority of TRIDENT modifications. These 
highly capable facilities coupled with TRIDENT fixed operating cycles greatly 
simplify the planning and accomplishment of alterations. 
2. TRIDENT Modification Processes 
Although TRIDENT modification processes are similar to those used 
in the FMP, there are some distinct differences. The two key areas of 
difference involve the SHIP AL T development process and the funding 
process. 
The equivalent TRIDENT alteration to a Title K SHIPALT is the 
Trident Ship Alteration (TRID). TRIDs are used for complex alterations 
which involve significant ILS impact. For purposes of comparison with the 
FMP, TRID processes will be discussed. 
a. SHIPALT Development 
TRIDENT alterations are developed under the "single alteration 
package" concept which addresses all aspects of the alteration. The Program 
Office plays a pivotal role throughout the entire TRID development process. 
A JCF is submitted by whomever is proposing a change to the Program Office. 
The Program Office forwards the JCF to the TYCOMs, Commander, Naval 
Submarine Forces, U.S. Atlantic/Pacific Fleet (SUBLANT /SUBPAC) for 
comments on the change proposal. The TYCOMs comment on whether the 
modification should be conducted if given the opportunity, give an opinion 
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of the TRID, and assign a relative priority to it. In the TRIDENT modification 
program, fleet feedback is done early in the process, prior to the approval of 
the JCF. 
The proposal then is forwarded to the TRIDENT Configuration 
Control Board. The TRIDENT Configuration Control Board ranks alterations 
based on military requirements, technical feasibility, cost, and logistic impact. 
Once approved, the Program Office assigns a Ship Alteration Manager (SAM) 
who is responsible for getting the entire modification package together and 
tracking the alteration. Additionally, a Planning Yard Alteration Team 
Leader is assigned for each alteration package. Under this "single alteration 
package" concept, all aspects of design, development, material (where 
applicable), and installation planning for the alteration are accomplished. 
b. Funding 
Although N6 funds Communications, Command, and Control 
(C3) procurements and installation, all other funding flows through and is 
controlled by the Program Office. The Program Office is responsible for 
programming, budgeting, and executing alterations. In contrast to funding 
for the FMP, TRIDENT budget lines are combined to the extent possible and 
contain all requirements for fully accomplishing the activities identified. 
Funding is not controlled at the individual alteration level. Instead, broad 
funding categories such as "Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E) 
Modernization" are used which cover all aspects of alterations including 
material, design, and installation. Figure 2 is an example of a NA VSEA (PMS 
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3. TRIDENT Alteration Exemption from the FMP 
In response to a draft of OPNA VINST 4720.2G concerning the possible 
inclusion of TRIDENT ship alterations into the FMP, NA VSEA (PMS 396) 
responded by meticulously pointing out why the TRIDENT Strategic 
Submarine Program should not be included in the FMP. The entire 
argument hinged on the fact that "the TRIDENT Program was conceived, 
designed and has been successfully implemented as a system comprised of 
OHIO Class submarines with rigid configuration control, dedicated support 
facilities and an integrated life cycle logistics plan." (NAVSEA (PMS 396) 
memo dated 11 January 1995) The memo emphasized that including the 
TRIDENT alteration program in the FMP " ... has the potential for 
compromising the strategic integrity of the program" and " ... will serve to de-
integrate a currently working system." (NA VSEA (PMS 396) memo dated 11 
January 1995) The memo concluded by stating: 
The TRIDENT Program, with its increased operational 
availability of OHIO Class ships, achieved by extremely effective 
control of not only ship design, but also the training facilities, 
refit facilities, TRIDENT rotatable pool equipments, 
maintenance procedures and equipment overhaul 
requirements, and the concurrent initiation of a singular design 
for new construction and operational submarines, is a unique 
program that requires unified resources and program control 
external to the FMP. (NA VSEA (PMS 396) memo dated 11 
January 1995) 
4. Summary 
The TRIDENT modernization program is a highly integrated part of 
the TRIDENT "cradle to grave" concept. This program, which consists of 
specialized and dedicated Trident Refit Facilities and meticulous 
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configuration control, is solely dedicated to modernizing OHIO Class 
submarines (platforms). Due to the fewer number of players, this program is 
much less complex and fragmented than the FMP. 
B. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE FMP 
Several recent working group studies have focused on the FMP. While 
many of these efforts have concentrated on specific components of the FMP 
such as ADP systems and not on program execution, they have been 
unanimous in pointing out that the weaknesses of the FMP far outnumber 
the strengths. The following statements provided by Ennis (et. al., 1995, p. 4-
11/12) present some current DoN perceptions of the FMP: 
• The current infrastructure for FMP is fragmented. 
• The FMP funding process is very complex and there is a lack of 
documented NA VCOMPT procedures. 
• It seems that the budget process has overtaken the modernization 
process and has become more important than the ships and the 
Sailors. 
• The Ship's PM (SPM) has the responsibility for the life cycle support 
of the ship. However, the SPMs really have no control over all 
aspects of the SHIP AL T process. 
• There is no FMP process, despite the existence of the FMP Manual. 
54 
------------------------------------------------
Other comments from the FMP Visionary Working Group (FMP Visionary 
Working Group Results, Ser 914P /3, 1 February 1995) concerning problems 
with the FMP funding process include: 
• FMP is not organized around the "process." 
• Different communities do it differently (lack of standards). 
• Current FMP policy and procedures are not conducive to a team 
approach. 
• No synergy between procurement and install (symptom of 
fragmentation?). 
In contrast to the TRIDENT modification program, the FMP is 
composed of multiple program managers, design activities, installation 
activities, OPNA V sponsors, and budget lines. An outside observer might 
logically ask, "who is in charge?". This "fragmented" composition is partly 
due to the variety of platforms associated with the FMP. Where the 
TRIDENT modification solely involves OHIO Class submarines, the FMP 
involves several classes of attack submarines and numerous classes of surface 
ships. Each of the latter FMP platforms can be modified in a variety of 
locations by a variety of sponsors. 
In order to objectively describe the strengths and weaknesses of the 
FMP, one needs to put the FMP in the proper perspective. First, ship 
modernization is a critical element of the strategic vision outlined in ... From 
the Sea and more recently in Forward ... From the Sea, and the results of the 
Bottom Up Review conducted by the DoD. Keeping this fact in mind and 
recognizing that the purpose of the FMP is to "provide a framework for the 
identification of modifications required to increase the capability or reliability 
of a ship (surface ship or attack submarine) to perform its assigned mission 
and accomplishment of these modifications," the two principal questions to 
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ask are has the FMP provided this framework and are ships in fact getting 
modified in accordance with OPNA V Platform Sponsor and TYCOM 
direction and desires? Addressing these two questions when evaluating the 
strengths and weaknesses of the FMP will help to separate the myths from the 
facts. 
1. Strengths 
Despite the lists of FMP weaknesses circulating throughout the DoN, 
two specific strengths of the FMP are worthy of mention. First, the current 
FMP budget structure which matches equipment to installation has greatly 
reduced the amount of equipment waiting to be installed and has greatly 
improved the accountability of total system end-item costs in the budget. The 
use of multiple P-1 lines, which has made the FMP less prone to marks and 
has reduced the likelihood that lower priority programs will be sacrificed to 
fund higher priority programs, has therefore contributed to getting the 
modernization equipment installed. Second, ships are getting modified in 
accordance with OPNA V Platform Sponsor and TYCOM direction and 
desires. 
· Most of the execution problems with the FMP are not with what is not 
getting done, they are with "how" it is getting done. To date, the majority of 
the conclusions and recommendations provided by the working groups have 
largely focused on the negative aspects of the FMP and have not built on, 
improved, and broadened its strengths. 
2. Weaknesses 
Keeping in mind the two underlying questions, there are however 
notable weaknesses with the FMP. Although largely "administrative" in 
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nature, they do add up. These "framework" weaknesses, which can be 
classified as either structural or funding, contribute to the overall inefficiency 
of the FMP and will if not adequately addressed, significantly degrade the FMP 
modification process in the future. 
a. Structural Weaknesses 
In striving to match equipment with installation, the focus of 
the FMP has shifted from "platform" to equipment. This focus on 
"equipment" by the multiple players involved with the FMP has promoted 
competing interests. Although instructions such as OPNA VINST 4720.2G 
meticulously define the relationships between the different sponsors on 
paper, in reality, without the emphasis on the "platform" this coordination is 
intermittent at best. Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs) between different 
sponsors are very slow to be worked out or never get established at all. Lack 
of coordination between the myriad of sponsors results in modification 
configuration control problems, some SHIP ALTs being installed without SIDs 
or not in accordance with SIDs, and insufficient funding for installation and 
DSA. Additionally, with both NA VSEA and N6 sharing a position of 
responsibility within the FMP, the question of "who is in charge?" can be 
legitimately asked. For example, it is hard to effectively run a ship with two 
acting commanding officers. Referring back to the two principal questions, 
modifications are being completed but the efficiency of the FMP "framework" 
is questionable. This lack of efficiency will inevitably lead to increased FMP 
costs in the long run. 
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b. Funding Weaknesses 
There are several key weakness associated with the current FMP 
budget structure shown in Figure 3. These weaknesses stem from the use of 
different appropriations and the large number of P-1 lines being budgeted and 
executed separately. The first key weakness which involves the use of 
different appropriations, OPN and O&MN, significantly increases the 
financial management complexity of the FMP process. Although equipment 
for Title K SHIP AL TS requiring HCPM is programmed by individual line 
item in OPN, DSA for this equipment is lumped into O&MN. Since O&MN 
funding is used for many other purposes, the potential for O&MN funds to be 
diverted to "higher priority" programs is extremely high. For Title K 
SHIP AL TS which do not require HCPM, both DSA and installation funding 
are in O&MN making the situation worse. The potential for funds being 
diverted to "higher priority" programs coupled with potential that Congress 
will mark large "pots" of money has significantly increased the likelihood of 
insufficient funds to complete alterations. These latter weaknesses associated 
with the use of different appropriations tend to offset to a certain degree any 
benefits received from using individual P-1 lines. 
In addition to increasing the financial management complexity 
of the FMP process, the use of separate appropriations severely restricts the 
flexibility of the FMP to respond to "CHURN" which can be caused by 
variables such as operational schedule changes, budget induced changes 
(schedule, additions, deletions), technological changes, threat changes, cost 
induced changes, priorities, statutory requirements, and 
decommissioning/inactivation schedule changes. If for example NAVSEA 
cannot fund a specific Title K SHIP ALT and the TYCOM offers to give up one 






































transfer of funds. The latter FMP funding weaknesses associated with the use 
of different appropriations coupled with the structural weaknesses of the FMP 
again raise the potential of procured HCPM being installed significantly after 
the FY it was budgeted to be installed or not being installed at all. 
The second key funding weakness associated with the FMP 
stems from the use of multiple P-1 lines in the budget. For example, in FY 
1995, approximately 65 P-1lines were used. The sheer number of individual 
P-1 lines being budgeted and executed separately requires a much larger 
administrative infrastructure to accurately record the multitude of 
required modification transactions. Even though computers ease this 
administrative burden, they do not necessarily eliminate it. Although it is 
hard to put a dollar figure on these transactions, there are hidden costs 
associated with preparing documentation and maintaining databases. 
Additionally the use of multiple lines and associated documentation 
increases the likelihood of unmatched disbursements, a systemic problem in 
the DoN. 
In addition to the large administrative burden which results 
from the use of multiple P-1 lines, individual P-1 line reprogramming 
thresholds constrain management in the execution of the FMP. During FY 
1995, NA VSEA processed 84 Below Threshold Reprogramming (BTR) 
requests involving approximately 25 percent of the total FMP budget. Of 
these 84 requests, five required NA VCOMPT approval. Only two of these five 
were approved. BTRs require a significant amount of preparation. This 
preparation adds to the overall cost of the FMP and the resultant funding 
manipulations in turn serve to decrease its efficiency. 
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C. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE TRIDENT 
MODERNIZATION PROGRAM 
In contrast to the FMP, few studies have been conducted on the 
TRIDENT modernization program. TRIDENT, however, is widely 
recognized throughout the DoD as a very successful and effective program. 
Why is this program so highly regarded? To answer this question, one again 
needs to put the program in the proper perspective. First, due to its strategic 
significance to the national defense posture, the TRIDENT program, until 
recently, has not been as financially constrained as the FMP. 
Notwithstanding, the real key to the success of the TRIDENT program lies in 
its structure. The TRIDENT program was designed from its inception to be a 
"cradle to grave" program: 
The TRIDENT FBM system consists of SSBN 726 Class 
submarines, their TRIDENT I (C4) or TRIDENT II (D5) weapon 
systems and a logistic support structure which has been planned, 
designed, and will be maintaine_d commensurate with the 
operational availability requirements of the approved 
characteristics for the 726 Class SSBNs. The 726 Class SSBN is 
designed to operate on a 95-day cycle. This cycle consists of 70 
days at sea on patrol and 25 days off patrol, which includes a 
continuous 18-day period between patrols for refit, incremental 
overhauls, appropriate modernizations, and resupply. A totally 
integrated logistic support (ILS) system has been developed to 
achieve and maintain this operational cycle throughout the life 
of the 726 Class SSBN .... 726 Class SSBNs will be supported from 
dedicated TRIDENT submarine bases located in the United States 
(OPNA VINST 4000.57E) 
In many respects, the TRIDENT System is very similar to another 
defense success story, the Strategic Air Command (SAC). SAC, like TRIDENT 
was a single purpose system with few restraints. SAC's purpose and mission, 
was clearly defined: "it was to bomb the Soviet Union back to the Stone Age." . 
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(Jones et. al., 1994, p. 38) One of SAC's exceptional leaders, General Curtis 
LeMay, developed SAC into " ... a military organization in which all else was 
ruthlessly subordinated to combat readiness and effectiveness justified in 
terms of the mission in which the organization served." (Huntington, 1961, 
p. 312) Jones further emphasizes that LeMay: 
... was given command of all the resources required to carry out 
SAC's mission. He had the authority to decide who and what 
SAC needed and who and what it did not. This effectively 
subordinated both the training and the procurement functions 
to SAC. (Jones et. al., 1994, pp. 39-40) 
In the TRIDENT System, with the majority of the funding flowing 
through and controlled by the Program Office, there is no question of "who is 
in charge." Alterations are meticulously tracked from inception to 
completion by SAMs who continuously coordinate with OPNA V sponsors. 
The use of dedicated TRIDENT facilities and fixed operating cycles 
significantly adds to the efficiency of the entire modification process. 
The TRIDENT program is clearly one of our nation's military success 
stories. Notwithstanding, there are aspects of the TRIDENT modernization 
program which are open for critique. These aspects are largely associated with 
its budget structure. As funding for strategic programs begins to decline, the 
broad categories of the TRIDENT budget structure will be more prone to 
congressional marks. Additionally, the use of broad modernization funding 
categories prevents the OSD and Congress from matching equipment to 
installation. To date the OSD and Congress have essentially left the 
TRIDENT program alone and have not been inclined to raise the "full 
funding" flag. As we get farther and farther from the Cold War, this 
temptation might change. 
Although the TRIDENT modification program has experienced the 
usual managerial and administrative ups and downs of any large 
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organization, its strengths far outnumber its weaknesses. In terms of a 
successful modification program, the TRIDENT program serves as a model 
for others: 
• Modifications are considered on a ''platform" basis vice an 
11 equipmenf' basis. 
• TRIDENT is a 11 cradle to grave" program which is managed and 
funded largely through a single Program Office. 
• TRIDENT utilizes specialized and dedicated TRIDENT Refit 
Facilities. 
• Alterations are developed under the 11Single alteration package" 
concept. 
• Ship Alteration Managers and Planning Yard Alteration Team 
Leaders are assigned to meticulously track alterations. 
• Budget lines contain all requirements for fully accomplishing 
alterations. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined the TRIDENT modernization program and 
evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of both the FMP and the TRIDENT 
modernization program. Although the TRIDENT modernization program is 
dedicated to the modernization of OHIO Class submarines, many of its key 
attributes should be carefully considered when determining the benefits of 
restructuring the FMP budget structure and making recommendations on 
how to restructure the FMP budget to improve program execution. 
In the next chapter, current DoN initiatives to restructure the FMP 
budget structure will be presented and evaluated. 
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VI. CURRENT PROPOSALS TO REDUCE FMP CYCLE TIME 
Utilizing the framework developed in the first five chapters of this 
study, Chapter VI objectively presents and evaluates the current DoN 
proposals to restructure the FMP budget structure from an "outside" 
perspective. Each proposal is presented largely in its original context and 
summarized with a brief evaluation. 
A. BACKGROUND 
As a result of its importance to the Navy's modernization efforts and 
in line with one of five Navy Acquisition Reform Senior Oversight Council 
(NARSOC) cycle time reduction initiatives, the FMP was nominated by the 
Navy for cycle time reduction. Under NA VSEA Performance Initiative #3 
whose purpose is "timely modernization, installed quickly, thoroughly tested, 
with complete logistics support," the NA VSEA Executive Steering 
Committee (ESC) chartered an FMP Cycle Time Reduction Working Group. 
The charter involved focusing on improvement opportunities for timely 
ship modernization with a goal of 50% reduction in FMP cycle time by the 
year 2000. The material for Chapter VI was exclusively taken from a working 
copy of the Cycle Time Reduction Working Group FMP Financial Structure 
Draft Proposals and therefore will not be individually cited. 
The FMP Cycle Time Reduction Working Group is comprised of four 
Sub-Groups which include: Ownership /Requirements, SHIP ALT 
Development and Material Support, SHIPALT Scheduling and Execution, 
and FMP Financial Structure. For purposes of this study, only the FMP 
Financial Structure Proposals will be addressed. 
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Although the FMP Financial Structure Proposals are still in the draft 
stage, four specific proposals are emerging. Ultimately, the Working Group 
could forward these individual proposals or a combination of the proposals. 
With the exception of Proposal #4 which mainly deals with peripheral aspects 
of the FMP, the first three proposals and discussion hit upon the key issues 
and closely parallel the FMP strengths and weaknesses presented in Chapter 
V. In order to preserve the context of the proposals and the Cycle Time 
Reduction Sub-Group's thought process throughoutthe preparation of these 
proposals, the Financial Structure Proposals have been left largely in the 
format used for a Working Group briefing held 15 February 1996. Additional 
commentary has been added for clarification as well as a brief evaluation of 
each proposal to help highlight key points and concerns. This treatment, 
coupled with the background and analysis of the first five chapters, will serve 
as the basis for conclusions and recommendations for further research in 
Chapter VII. 
B. THE ISSUES 
The three specific FMP issues addressed in the Working Group briefing 
included the FMP's inadequate flexibility to accommodate a very dynamic 
program, the FMP's financial management complexity, and the FMP's poor 
budget visibility. With respect to the FMP's inadequate flexibility, the 
discussion centered around "CHURN." Although managers within the FMP 
have for the most part been able to "work around" CHURN, this 
extraordinary effort serves to shift the focus away from "modernization" and 
toward "manipulation." The extra time involved with ensuring alterations 
occur adds to the overall inefficiency of the FMP. 
The second issue highlighted the FMP' s financial management 





different structures and rules complicates the FMP process. For example, 
equipment alterations are funded in OPN (equipment and installation) and 
non-equipment alterations are funded in O&MN. Additionally, DSA, a 
critical element of the FMP, is funded in O&MN. A large percentage of the 
current problems with the FMP involve inadequate DSA funds to support 
programmed installations. Millions of dollars of SHIP ALT work continues to 
be jeopardized due to lack of the small percentage of DSA needed up front to 
produce alteration packages. Since DSA is funded in O&MN it is vulnerable 
to marks and diversion. Additionally, inaccurate DSA estimates can 
exacerbate the problem. 
In addition to the use of different appropriations, the number of 
individual P-1 lines adds to the financial management complexity of the 
FMP. Each of the six sponsors' accounts (N6, Director Supportability, 
Maintenance, and Modernization Division (N43), N85, N86, N87, N88) are 
separately budgeted and executed. 
The third issue addressed the FMP's poor budget visibility. Even with 
exhibits such as the P-3A exhibit which links procurement to installation and 
displays the total costs of alterations, with different appropriations and 
different appropriation analysts within N82 it is difficult for sponsors and 
N82 to review and analyze the FMP as a single e~tity. Since FMP funding is 
spread between different appropriations and funding for alterations is not 
completely contained within a single appropriation, the full effects of funding 
reductions are often realized long after the cuts are made. 
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C. SOLUTION CRITERIA 
Given the latter issues, the FMP Financial Structure Sub-Group defined 
specific solution criteria: 
• Increase the claimant's execution flexibility. 
• Maintain the procurement/installation link. 
• Protect Navy Total Obligational Authority (TOA). 
• Support communication of sponsor desires. 
• Make it simple for people buying the equipment. 
• Fairly adjust depot service costs. 
• Better relate costs to increased capability. 
• Reduce administrative burden. 
D. ASSUMPTIONS 
The Sub-Group made four assumptions with respect to the future of 
the FMP. The assumptions included: program "CHURN" will not decrease; 
cost estimating is as accurate as it can be; reprogramming thresholds will not 
change; and FMP guidance and rules may be changed. Although the Sub-
Group declined to focus on cost estimating, in actuality, inadequate cost 
estimating could be contributing to current FMP execution problems and 
should be studied in-depth. 
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E. FMP FINANCIAL STRUCTURE PROPOSALS 
1. FMP FINANCIAL STRUCTURE PROPOSAL #1 
The FMP Financial Structure Sub-Group's Proposal #1 recommends 
placing all the FMP under a single appropriation, specifically OPN. Under 
this proposal, funding for non-equipment alterations and DSA would be 
moved from O&MN to OPN. DSA would be made part of the "Advance 
Planning and Installation" line. Figure 4 is the proposed FMP funding 
structure. 
If OPN is not approved for the entire FMP, the Sub-Group, under 
Proposal #1 would recommend moving DSA to OPN and leaving the non-
equipment alterations funded in O&MN. Another option would be to fund 
DSA for equipment alterations in OPN and DSA for non-equipment 
alterations in O&MN. 
a. Pros and Cons of FMP Financial Structure 
Proposal #1 
On the positive side, Proposal #1 would significantly increase 
FMP execution flexibility enabling FMP managers to respond to "CHURN." 
Currently, moving OPN to/from O&MN requires congressional approval 
during execution. Although with a single appropriation, the $10 million 
reprogramming threshold would still exist, this restriction has not been a 
problem in the past. Additionally, Proposal #1 would again "fully fund" 
modifications under a single procurement appropriation linking DSA to 
installation and reducing modification funding from the vulnerability that 
O&MN is susceptible to. 
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Figure 4. Proposed FMP Funding Structure. 
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On the negative side, non-equipment alterations are not 
currently tied to an end item procurement in the budget. Additionally, under 
Proposal #1, there could be a potential increase in the number of P-1lines or 
expansion of the cost codes within each P-1 line. 
b. Evaluation 
On the surface, Proposal #1 appears to be an easy fix to the FMP 
dilemma. Placing all the FMP under a single appropriation would greatly 
improve execution flexibility and would significantly reduce the vulnerability 
that O&MN is susceptible to. However, upon further investigation, there are 
some significant concerns associated with this proposal. First, in order to 
make the recommendation to move DSA back into OPN, one needs to 
understand OSD's motive for placing "Modernization Support" (DSA) in 
O&MN in the first place. Although this shift was reportedly " ... a result of an 
OSD determination that these requirements should not be in the 
procurement appropriations since they did not relate to an end-item 
installation," there were probably additional reasons (maybe political or . 
financial) behind OSD's decision. (FMP Manual, p. EXSUM-4) Prior to this 
decision being made, the Navy openly disagreed with OSD's justification for 
the move. 
Second, assuming no other changes are made to the FMP 
financial structure, Proposal #1 would significantly increase the required 
number of FMP funding documents. In FY 95, 200 basic funding documents 
were produced just for the DSA allocation of the FMP. Of these 200 
documents, 271 amendments were required. If DSA is funded in OPN (by 
individual P-1 line), assuming no relaxation of the current FMP 
rules/procedures, 3400 basic funding documents would be required. Taking 
amendments into consideration, possibly 6000-7000 total documents would be 
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required to execute the FMP under this proposal. For example, Norfolk 
Naval Shipyard is the planning yard for LHA-1. Currently DSA is O&MN 
funded and a single funding document is required. If DSA is OPN funded 
there might be 15 different documents required due to the number of. 
individual P-1 lines in OPN associated with LHA-1. If the current FMP 
funding rules are relaxed, a possible solution to this problem would be to 
submit one funding document citing 15 separate lines. If current FMP 
funding rules are not relaxed, more funding documents would not result in 
better FMP execution efficiency. 
Third, putting all FMP funding back into OPN could 
significantly jeopardize FMP execution performance. Due to the long lead 
times associated with modernization equipment, the three year obligational 
authority of OPN funds was frequently exceeded in the early 1990s under the 
"full funding" concept. The assumption to make here is that "annualization" 
of installation costs would continue. Remember, Congress reluctantly 
accepted DoD's argument for "annualization" to begin with. Any further 
FMP execution problems would add fuel to Congress' conclusion that the 
FMP is plagued with "managerial" problems. Congressional "distrust" could 
in turn result in more congressional micromanagement of the FMP thereby 
hindering efforts to improve FMP execution effectiveness and efficiency. 
2. FMP FINANCIAL STRUCTURE PROPOSAL #2 
The FMP Financial Structure Sub-Group's Proposal #2 recommends 
reducing the number of P-1 lines. Under this proposal, FMP OPN installation 
lines would be reduced and similar P-1lines would be combined. For 
example, the SQQ-89, surface sonar support equipment, and surface sonar 
windows would be combined under a single line labeled "Surface ASW 
Sensors." Proposal #2 does not incorporate Proposal #1; O&MN parts of the 
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FMP would remain unchanged. The Sub-Group has not ruled out the 
possibility of consolidating both proposals. 
a. Pros and Cons of FMP Financial Structure 
Proposal #2 
On the positive side, Proposal #2 would significantly increase 
FMP execution flexibility enabling FMP managers to respond to fleet and 
sponsor needs. Specific funding shortfalls could be funded within individual 
P-1 lines to respond to fleet and TYCOM desires. TYCOMs currently have the 
flexibility of funding TitleD and F SHIPALTs from a "single pot." 
Additionally, Proposal #2 would significantly reduce the administrative 
burden of executing the program. 
On the negative side, this proposal may reduce the sponsor's 
ability to communicate priorities to the claimants (NA VSEA, SP AWAR, 
NA V AIR} via the budget. Other Proposal #2 drawbacks discussed during the 
Working Group briefing included reduced flexibility to BTR funds between P-
llines, POM/PR process complicated with respect to programming 
equipment funds, less easily identifiable full funding discipline and 
justification to the OSD and Congress, and larger P-llines are more 
susceptible to non-program specific reductions. 
b. Evaluation 
Again, Proposal #2 on the surface appears to be a viable solution 
to the FMP's inherent inflexibility. With respect to TitleD and F SHIPALTs, 
the "single pot" concept has greatly improved program flexibility and has 
been widely heralded throughout the Navy as a significant step toward 
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streamlining the modification process. Title D and F SHIP ALTS are however 
not as "equipment" intensive as Title K SHIP AL TS and therefore do not 
involve as many "competing" interests. Grouping similar equipment under 
a single ~-1 ~ine significantly reduces individual sponsors' control over the 
modification process. Unless the FMP structure is changed in conjunction 
with this proposal, it is unlikely that sponsors will agree to less control. 
Understanding that the current reprogramming restrictions 
allow moving up to $10 million between individual P-1 lines, fewer P-1 lines 
would result in less reprogramming flexibility. Realistically, this restraint 
should not inhibit execution of the FMP since larger P-1 lines would give 
managers the flexibility to move funds within lines. 
Although the POM/PR process under this proposal would be 
potentially more complicated with respect to programming equipment funds, 
execution flexibility should outweigh this concern. Additionally, with proper 
budget exhibits, the "full funding" discipline can be maintained. 
One key concern, in addition to that of sponsor control, is that 
larger P-1 lines may be more susceptible to marks. Since this proposal 
involves installation fl.mds, insufficient installation funds would result in 
modernization equipment not getting installed; the situation the FMP was in 
when "full funding" was first implemented in FY 1990. In FY 1995, a $13 
million across the board mark indicates that even the current FMP budget 
structure is prone to marks and raises the question whether larger P-1 lines 
are really more susceptible. These two concerns must be carefully evaluated 
prior to recommending this proposal. 
3. FMP FINANCIAL STRUCTURE PROPOSAL #3 
The FMP Financial Structure Sub-Group's Proposal #3 recommends 
restructuring P-1 installation lines by "platform." This proposal would shift 
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the focus of the FMP from equipment and systems to ship I platform 
management significantly reducing the number of cross-sponsor lines. 
Current P-1 lines are by equipment such as "Pollution Control," 
"Firefighting," and "LM-2500." Imbedded in this recommendation is a caveat 
that cross-sponsor portions of the current FMP that are currently working 
should not be broken. For example, it is easier for one sponsor to buy 
equipment to be installed by multiple sponsors (ex. SPS-48 radars bought by 
N86). 
a. Pros and Cons of FMP Financial Structure 
Proposal #3 
On the positive side, Proposal #3 would increase execution 
flexibility. It would shift the focus from hardware procurement to 
modernization in the current environment of greatly reduced procurement 
spending and would support effective analysis of the FMP as a single entity. 
Additionally, Proposal #3 supports compliance with the regional 
maintenance concept. On the negative side, Proposal #3: 
• Complicates equipment life cycle support. 
• Complicates congressional oversight and may alter "perceptions." 
• Results in loss of easily identifiable full funding discipline and 
justification to the OSD and Congress. 
• Increases number of P-llines. 
• Results in an increased effort to defend budget exhibits. 
• Reduces ability of sponsors to communicate priorities to claimants 
via the budget. 
75 
• Removes the sponsor from the decision chain regarding 
reprogramming of funds if multiple ship classes are represented in 
a single P-1 line. 
• Complicates POM/PR process i.e., programming funds for 
equipment. 
b. Evaluation 
Proposal #3 is in consonance with the "TRIDENT" concept; the 
"platform" should take precedence over the "equipment." Unlike Proposals 
#1 and #2, this proposal would radically change the FMP. Radical change 
however, might be just what the FMP needs. Many of the changes in the 
FMP budget structure over the last five years have been incremental in 
nature. Following implementation of "full funding" in FY 1990, follow-on 
changes have merely been variations on the same theme. 
Incorporated in this proposal would be a structural change to the 
FMP. When considering FMP structure, two areas of concern must be 
addressed. The first area involves sponsor control. Sponsors largely exert 
their control through individual P-1 lines. Although Proposal #3 maintains 
the current number of equipment P-1lines, it combines installation for this 
equipment under platform headings. The key question with respect to 
sponsor control is will the sponsors agree to less control? If "modernization" 
is really the priority and given that "trust" is an inherent part of this proposal, 
this aspect of a structural change should be able to be worked out. The second 
area involves the overall management of the FMP. The key question with 
respect to FMP management is should a single organization be given sole 
responsibility for managing the FMP? Clearly, a single organization would be 
more effective. With a "platform" emphasis and a single organization in 
charge of the FMP, the question of "who is in charge?" could once and for all 
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be answered. The problem with shifting to a single organization in charge of 
the FMP is that this shift would not be easy. Power struggles and current FMP 
administrative infrastructure could make the shift extremely messy, 
potentially alleviating any of the gains. Regardless of the latter concerns, 
Proposal #3 offers a refreshing alternative to the "status quo." 
4. FMP FINANCIAL STRUCTURE PROPOSAL #4 
The FMP Financial Structure Sub-Group's Proposal #4 recommends 
making the fleets the budgeting office for ship depot availability shipyard 
service costs. This proposal would transfer FMP naval shipyard service funds 
to fleet maintenance accounts. 
a. Pros and Cons of FMP Financial Structure 
Proposal #4 
On the positive side, Proposal #4 would alleviate many of the 
problems which arise during execution of ship depot availabilities at public 
shipyards. Additionally, manday rates would be more stable. On the negative 
side, Proposal #4: 
• Could result in funding shortfalls in the ship alteration and/ or fleet 
budgets. Identifying the actual amount of funding for such a budget 
based transfer would be extremely difficult. 
• Does not adequately address the NA VSEA-08 requirement to 
control all nuclear SHIP AL T funding. 
• Further fragments FMP funding and obscures total alteration cost. 
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b. Evaluation 
Although this proposal deals with "peripheral" aspects of the 
FMP, making the fleets the budgeting office for ship depot availability 
shipyard service costs would only serve to further "fragment" the FMP budget 
structure and obscure total alteration cost. Further analysis of this change is 
needed prior to incorporating it into an overall recommendation for 
improving FMP efficiency. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined the current DoN proposals to restructure 
the FMP budget structure to improve FMP effectiveness and efficiency. 
Although these proposals are still in the draft stage, they provide potential 
solutions to key FMP problems. With the exception of Proposal #3, each 
proposal takes an "incremental" approach to improving FMP execution 
effectiveness and efficiency. This incremental approach closely parallels the 
FMP budget structure changes since the shift to "full funding" in FY 1990. 
Proposal #3, a radical departure from the "incremental" approach, offers to 
shift the emphasis of the FMP from "equipment" to "platform" which is in 
consonance with the TRIDENT concept. Although no one proposal alone 
provides a single solution to improving FMP effectiveness and efficiency, a 
combination of key points of each of the proposals could significantly 
improve FMP execution and reverse current perceptions throughout the fleet 
such as "it seems that the budget process has overtaken the modernization 
process and has become more important than the ships and the Sailors." 
(Ennis et. al., 1995, p. 4-11) 
The next chapter reflects on the FMP dilemma, provides 
conclusions, and offers recommendations for further research. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. REFLECTIONS 
There is no doubt, following completion of this study, that the current 
FMP is a complex and highly "fragmented" program. Before making more 
changes to a program which has seen constant change over the last five years, 
one needs to fully understand the changes which have been made, the 
reasons behind these changes, and their historical context. 
Incorporated into the many FMP budget structure changes since FY 
1989 has been the notion of management control. To appreciate the shift to 
"full funding" in FY 1990 and the "incremental" FMP budget structure 
changes which have followed, one needs to have a good understanding of the 
different types of appropriations and their associated controls. Since colonial 
times, Congress has generally favored more control through the use of line-
item appropriations. The executive on the other hand has favored lump-
sum appropriations which provide more flexibility. Although it is hard to 
· conclusively determine why congressional control of the military purse has 
waxed and waned throughout the nation's history, "distrust of the executive" 
has generally resulted in more control and the use of line-item 
appropriations. It was Congress' distrust of the DoD's and the DoN's ability to 
effectively manage the installation of modification equipment which resulted 
in Congress' decision to direct the DoD and the DoN to "fully fund" the FMP 
beginning in FY 1990. 
The degree to. which Congress will continue to apply control to the 
FMP is directly related to Congress' "perception" of the FMP managerial 
situation. Currently, without a single OPNA V advocate of the FMP and with 
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the operational fleet against the FMP' s inefficient and misunderstood 
processes, it is unlikely that Congress will choose to apply less control in the 
future unless radical changes are made. The problem with more FMP control 
at this point, is that more control will inevitably lead to more inefficiency 
given the current FMP structure. 
Despite the perceived notion that the FMP is mismanaged, managers 
within the FMP have been able to work around the FMP' s inherent 
inflexibility to ensure modifications get accomplished in accordance with 
sponsor and TYCOM desires. A good example of a "work around" involves 
SHIP AL T SSN-3818 which installs the six inch countermeasure on SSN 688 
Class submarines. This SHIP AL T is funded in OPN line C2WM (Sub 
Acoustic Warfare). Equipment procurements were made to support the 
installation of this SHIPALT on three submarines in FY 1995. During the 
budget process, installation reductions occurred in the SHIPALT's associated 
OPN line making it unexecutable. The Planning Yard was able to break 
SHIPALT SSN-3818 into two separate SHIPALTS, SHIPALT SSN-4024 for 
structural changes and SHIP ALT SSN-4025 for electrical installations. 
SHIPALT SSN-4024, the most expensive of the two, was furided in O&MN 
and SHIP ALT SSN-4025 was funded with available SHIP ALT SSN-3818 
dollars in OPN. Although this example demonstrates that managers can 
work around the FMP's inflexibility, these manipulations are not free. 
Additional DSA dollars were used to fund the development of SHIP AL T 
SSN-4024 and SSN-4025. Ultimately, with further budget reductions on the 
horizon, these managerial manipulations will not be able to make up for the 
FMP's inherent inflexibility; modifications will not get accomplished and 
higher program costs will be incurred. More program controls would only 
exacerbate this problem. 
Setting the issue of control aside for a moment, the future of the FMP 
is also tied to the "modernization" versus "readiness" debate, a hotly 
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contested partisan issue in both the executive and legislative branches of 
government. In the post Cold War era of markedly reduced defense 
procurement spending, modernization of existing assets is a critical element 
of our defense posture. Although the FMP comprises only a fraction of our 
total defense and Navy budget, this small investment significantly 
contributes to our ability to meet the "threat." Unfortunately, the FMP to date 
has not been high on the list of DoD and DoN priorities. To improve the 
FMP requires commitment from senior leadership within the DoD and the 
DoN. Without this commitment, any recommended changes will eventually 
lead to more of the same. 
Provided there is a dedicated commitment to reform the FMP from 
senior DoD and DoN leadership and provided "modernization" is a national 
priority, the TRIDENT modernization program offers a refreshing alternative 
to the status quo. By emphasizing the "platform" vice the "equipment," 
modernization takes on a whole new meaning. Although the TRIDENT 
modernization program is dedicated to the modernization of OHIO Class 
submarines, many of its key attributes should be carefully considered when 
determining the benefits of restructuring the FMP budget structure and 
making recommendations on how to restructure the FMP budget to improve 
program execution. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Current Strategic management theory discusses organizational change 
and provides recommendations on when this change should occur. 
Imbedded in this change is a "fit" between the external environment and 
internal capability. Mintzberg argues that when " ... the organization's strategic 
orientation moves out of sync with its environment...a strategic revolution 
must take place." (Mintzberg et. al., 1992, p. 111) Although a specific 
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discussion of strategic management theory is beyond the scope of this study, 
the latter generalizations can be directly applied to the FMP. 
Careful analysis of the FMP changes over the past five years indicates 
that although this period can be characterized by constant change, the changes 
have not adequately taken the FMP's external environment into 
consideration. The FMP' s external environment has dramatically changed 
over the last five years. Some of the key external changes include the end of 
the Cold War, the defense drawdown, and markedly reduced defense 
procurement spending. Although recent FMP changes have addressed the 
need to ensure control in light of significantly reduced defense spending 
levels, the FMP changes have not adequately addressed its inefficiency; fewer 
resources increases the need for program efficiency. 
In order to adequately address the FMP's inherent inflexibility, 
J/revolutionary" not incremental change must take place. The TRIDENT 
program model provides a good starting point for this significant change: 
• Modifications are considered on a uplatform" basis vice an 
J/ equipment" basis. 
• TRIDENT is a J/ cradle to graven program which is managed and 
funded largely through a single Program Office. 
• TRIDENT utilizes specialized and dedicated TRIDENT Refit 
Facilities. 
• Alterations are developed under the J/single alteration package" 
concept. 
• Ship Alteration Managers and Planning Yard Alteration Team 
Leaders are assigned to meticulously track alterations. 




Even though the TRIDENT program solely involves OHIO Class submarines 
which utilize two specialized and dedicated TRIDENT Refit Facilities (TRFs), 
its key attributes can be directly applied to the FMP. 
Based on the research in this thesis, in order to improve program 
execution, the FMP should be radically restructured. Specific attributes of this 
new structure should include: 
• Modifications considered on a "platform" basis vice an 
"equipment" basis. 
• Single organization in charge of the FMP. 
• SPMs totally responsible for platform modernization. 
• Alterations developed under the "single alteration package" 
concept. 
• Ship Alteration Managers and Planning Yard Alteration Team 
Leaders assigned to meticulously track alterations. 
• Sponsors' desires maintained. 
• Clearly visible procurement/installation match in budget. 
• Budget lines contain all requirements for fully accomplishing 
alterations. DSA funds grouped with "Advance Planning and 
Installation. N 
Investments "fully funded" in OPN. 
Modifications not classified as investments "fully funded" in 
O&MN. 
• Single path for flow of funds. 
Incorporating the latter attributes into a significant change to the FMP 
will not necessarily be an easy task. With multiple program managers, design 
activities, installation activities, OPNA V sponsors, and platforms involved, 
getting all the players to agree will be challenging. Some of the key areas of 
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debate will center on equipment which crosses between sponsors. This 
significant change requires commitment not only from senior leadership 
within the DoD and the DoN, but from all the individuals and organizations 
involved with the FMP. Additionally, as noted earlier, this change is also tied 
to the current debate on "modernization" versus "readiness." Provided that 
modernization is a national priority, this radical change which is specifically 
designed to improve FMP efficiency and effectiveness will be a significant step 
toward reversing Congress' "perception" of this vital program; a perception 
which could in tum lead to less control and even greater execution flexibility, 
clearly the ultimate benefit in the eyes of the executive. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In consonance with the key attributes of a significant change to the 
FMP, several important areas remain to be explored. This study provides the 
in-depth FMP background required to begin attacking these specific areas. The 
first area, discussed in Chapter VI, is that of cost estimating. Although not a 
focus of the FMP Financial Structure Sub-Group, inadequate cost estimating is 
very likely contributing to current FMP execution problems. Concentrating 
on cost estimating associated with DSA, installation, and advance planning 
could reveal methods to reduce program costs. 
The second area involves designating a single organization to be in 
charge of the FMP. Although there is no doubt that a single organization in 
charge of the FMP would streamline execution, the dynamics of the current 
structure need to be carefully evaluated before defining the specifics of this 
aspect of the change. 
The third area involves an actual cost benefit analysis of the current 
FMP and a streamlined FMP. Utilizing the background provided by this 
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study, actual costs associated with the day to day operation of the FMP could 
be systematically evaluated. 
The fourth area involves equipment which crosses between sponsors. 
A key obstacle to shifting the focus of the FMP from equipment to platform 
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APPENDIX. TYPES OF FMP SHIPALTS 
1. Title D SHIP ALT - A permanent alteration that is equivalent to a 
repair, does not affect the military characteristics of a ship, and may 
require Centrally Provided Material (CPM) but does not require 
Headquarters CPM (HCPM) for accomplishment. TitleD alterations 
generally include more efficient, cost effective designs that improve 
ship maintainability. TitleD alterations are technically approved by 
NA VSEA and authorized for accomplishment by the fleet CINC. 
2. Title F SHIP ALT - A permanent alteration that does not affect the 
military characteristics of a ship, does not require CPM, and is within 
the capabilities of ship's force for accomplishment. Title F alterations 
are technically approved by NA VSEA and authorized for 
accomplishment by the fleet CINC. 
3. Title K SHIP ALT - A permanent alteration to provide a military 
characteristic or additional capability not previously held by a ship 
affecting configuration controlled areas or systems of a ship or which 
otherwise requires the installation of HCPM. These alterations are 
approved for development and authorized for accomplishment by the 
CNO (military improvements) or the HSC (non-military 
improvements). The technical approval for Title K SHIPALTs is 
provided by NA VSEA. 
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